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During the week of August 6, 2007, a number of quantitative long/short equity hedge funds experienced
unprecedented losses. It has been hypothesized that a coordinated deleveraging of similarly constructed
portfolios caused this temporary dislocation in the market. Using the simulated returns of long/short
equity portfolios based on five specific valuation factors, we find evidence that the unwinding of these
portfolios began in July 2007 and continued until the end of 2007. Using transactions data, we find
that the simulated returns of a simple marketmaking strategy were significantly negative during the
week of August 6, 2007, but positive before and after, suggesting that the Quant Meltdown of August
2007 was the combined effects of portfolio deleveraging throughout July and the first week of August,
and a temporary withdrawal of marketmaking risk capital starting August 8th.  Our simulations point
to two unwinds---a mini-unwind on August 1st starting at 10:45am and ending at 11:30am, and a more
sustained unwind starting at the open on August 6th and ending at 1:00pm---that began with stocks
in the financial sector and long Book-to-Market and short Earnings Momentum.  These conjectures
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References 551 Introduction and Summary
During the ﬁrst half of 2007, events in the U.S. sub-prime mortgage markets aﬀected many
parts of the ﬁnancial industry, setting the stage for more turmoil in the ﬁxed-income and
credit world. Apart from stocks in the ﬁnancial sector, equity markets were largely unaﬀected
by these troubles. With the beneﬁt of hindsight, however, signs of macro stress and shifting
expectations of future economic conditions were apparent in equity prices during this period.
In July 2007, the performance of certain well-known equity-valuation factors such as Fama
and French’s Small-Minus-Big (SMB) market-cap and High-Minus-Low (HML) Book-to-
Market factors began a downward trend, and while this fact is unremarkable in and of itself,
the events that transpired during the second week of August 2007 have made it much more
meaningful.
Starting on Monday, August 6th and continuing through Thursday, August 9th, some of
the most successful equity hedge funds in the history of the industry reported record losses.1
But what made these losses even more extraordinary was the fact that they seemed to be
concentrated among quantitatively managed equity market-neutral or “statistical arbitrage”
hedge funds, giving rise to the monikers “Quant Meltdown” and “Quant Quake” of 2007.
In Khandani and Lo (2007), we analyzed the Quant Meltdown of 2007 by simulating
the returns of a speciﬁc equity market-neutral strategy—the contrarian trading strategy of
Lehmann (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990)—and proposed the “Unwind Hypothesis” to
explain the empirical facts (see also Goldman Sachs Asset Management, 2007, and Rothman
2007a–c). This hypothesis suggests that the initial losses during the second week of August
2007 were due to the forced liquidation of one or more large equity market-neutral portfolios,
primarily to raise cash or reduce leverage, and the subsequent price impact of this massive
1For example, the Wall Street Journal reported on August 10, 2007 that “After the close of trading,
Renaissance Technologies Corp., a hedge-fund company with one of the best records in recent years, told
investors that a key fund has lost 8.7% so far in August and is down 7.4% in 2007. Another big fund company,
Highbridge Capital Management, told investors its Highbridge Statistical Opportunities Fund was down 18%
as of the 8th of the month, and was down 16% for the year. The $1.8 billion publicly traded Highbridge
Statistical Market Neutral Fund was down 5.2% for the month as of Wednesday... Tykhe Capital, LLC—a
New York-based quantitative, or computer-driven, hedge-fund ﬁrm that manages about $1.8 billion—has
suﬀered losses of about 20% in its largest hedge fund so far this month...” (see Zuckerman, Hagerty, and
Gauthier-Villars, 2007), and on August 14, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Goldman Sachs Global
Equity Opportunities Fund “...lost more than 30% of its value last week...” (Sender, Kelly, and Zuckerman,
2007).
1and sudden unwinding caused other similarly constructed portfolios to experience losses.
These losses, in turn, caused other funds to deleverage their portfolios, yielding additional
price impact that led to further losses, more deleveraging, and so on. As with Long Term
Capital Management (LTCM) and other ﬁxed-income arbitrage funds in August 1998, the
deadly feedback loop of coordinated forced liquidations leading to deterioration of collateral
value took hold during the second week of August 2007, ultimately resulting in the collapse of
a number of quantitative equity market-neutral managers, and double-digit losses for many
others.
This Unwind Hypothesis underscores the apparent commonality among quantitative eq-
uity market-neutral hedge funds and the importance of liquidity in determining market
dynamics. We focus on these twin issues in this paper by simulating the performance of
typical mean-reversion and valuation-factor-based long/short equity portfolios, and by using
transactions data during the months surrounding August 2007 to measure market liquidity
and price impact before, during, and after the Quant Meltdown. With respect to the for-
mer simulations, we ﬁnd that during the month of July 2007, portfolios constructed based
on traditional equity-valuation factors (Book-to-Market, Earnings-to-Price and Cashﬂow-to-
Market) steadily declined, while portfolios constructed based on “momentum” metrics (Price
Momentum and Earnings Momentum) increased. With respect to the latter simulations, we
ﬁnd that intra-daily liquidity in U.S. equity markets declined signiﬁcantly during the second
week of August, and that the expected return of a simple mean-reversion strategy increased
monotonically with the holding period during this time, i.e., those marketmakers that were
able to hold their positions longer received higher premiums. The shorter-term losses also im-
ply that marketmakers reduced their risk capital during this period. Together, these results
suggest that the Quant Meltdown of August 2007 began in July with the steady unwinding
of one or more factor-driven portfolios, and this unwinding caused signiﬁcant dislocation in
August because the pace of liquidation increased and because liquidity providers decreased
their risk capital during the second week of August.
If correct, these conjectures highlight additional risks faced by investors in long/short
equity funds, namely “tail risk” due to occasional liquidations and deleveraging that may
be motivated by events completely unrelated to equity markets. Such risks also imply that
long/short equity strategies may contribute to systemic risk because of their ubiquity, their
2importance to market liquidity and price continuity, and their impact on market dynamics
when capital is suddenly withdrawn.
As in Khandani and Lo (2007), we wish to acknowledge at the outset that the hypothe-
ses advanced in this paper are speculative, tentative, and based solely on indirect evidence.
Because the events surrounding the Quant Meltdown involve hedge funds, proprietary trad-
ing desks, and their prime brokers and credit counterparties, primary sources are virtually
impossible to access. Such sources are not at liberty to disclose any information about their
positions, strategies, or risk exposures, hence the only means for obtaining insight into these
events are indirect. However, in contrast to our earlier claim in Khandani and Lo (2007)
that “...the answer to the question of what happened to the quants in August 2007 is indeed
known, at least to a number of industry professionals who were directly involved...”, we now
believe that industry participants directly involved in the Quant Meltdown may not have
been fully aware of the broader milieu in which they were operating. Accordingly, there is
indeed a role for academic studies that attempt to piece together the various components of
the market dislocation of August 2007 by analyzing the simulated performance of speciﬁc
investment strategies like the strategies considered in this paper and in Khandani and Lo
(2007).
Nevertheless, we recognize the challenges that outsiders face in attempting to understand
such complex issues without the beneﬁt of hard data, and emphasize that our educated
guesses may be oﬀ the mark given the limited data we have to work with. We caution
readers to be appropriately skeptical of our hypotheses, as are we.
We begin in Section 2 with a brief review of the literature. The data we use to construct
our valuation factors and perform our strategy simulations are described in Section 3. The
factor deﬁnitions and the results of the factor-based simulations are contained in Section 4.
In Section 5, we use two alternate measures of market liquidity to assess the evolution of
liquidity in the equity markets since 1995, and how it changed during the Quant Meltdown
of 2007. Using these tools, we are able to pinpoint the origins of the Meltdown to a speciﬁc
date and time, and even to particular groups of stocks. We conclude in Section 6.
32 Literature Review
Although the focus of our study is the Quant Meltdown of August 2007, several recent
papers have considered the causes and inner workings of the broader liquidity and credit
crunch of 2007–2008. For example, Gorton (2008) discusses the detail of security design and
securitization of sub-prime mortgages and argues that lack of transparency arising from the
interconnected link of securitization is at the heart of the problem. Brunnermeier (2008)
argues that the mortgage-related losses are relatively small. For example, he indicates that
the total expected losses are about the same amount of wealth lost in a non-so-uncommon
2% to 3% drop in the U.S. stock market. Starting from this observation, he emphasizes the
importance of the ampliﬁcation mechanism at play, and argues that borrowers’ deteriorating
balance sheets generate liquidity spirals from relatively small shocks. Once started, these
spirals continue as lower asset prices and higher volatility raise margin levels and lower
available leverage. Adrian and Shin (2008) document a pro-cyclical relationship between
the leverage of U.S. investment banks and the sizes of their balance sheets and explore
the aggregate eﬀects that such a relationship can have on asset prices and the volatility
risk premium. This empirical observation increases the likelihood of Brunnermeier’s (2008)
margin and deleveraging spiral. Allen and Carletti (2008) provide a more detailed analysis of
the role of liquidity in the ﬁnancial crisis and consider the source of the current “cash-in-the-
market” pricing, i.e. market prices that are signiﬁcantly below what plausible fundamentals
would suggest.
Following the onset of the credit crunch in July 2007, beginning on August 6th, many
equity hedge funds reported signiﬁcant losses and much of the blame was placed on quanti-
tative factors, or the “Quants”, as the most severe losses appear to have been concentrated
among quantitative hedge funds. The research departments of the major investment banks
were quick to produce analyses, e.g., Goldman Sachs Asset Management (2007) and Roth-
man (2007a,b,c), citing coordinated losses among portfolios constructed according to several
well-known quant factors, and arguing that simultaneous deleveraging and a lack of liquidity
were responsible for these losses. For example, the study by Rothman (2007a)—which was
ﬁrst released on August 9, 2007—reports the performance of a number of quant factors and
attributes the simultaneous bad performance to “a liquidity based deleveraging phenomena”.
4Goldman Sachs Asset Management (2007) provide additional evidence from foreign equity
markets (Japan, U.K., and Europe-ex-U.K.), indicating that the unwinds involved more than
just U.S. securities. In a follow-up study, Rothman (2007b) called attention to the perils
of endogenous risk; in referring to the breakdown of the risk models during that period, he
concluded that: “By and large, they understated the risks as they were not calibrated for
quant managers/models becoming our own asset class, creating our own contagion”.2 Using
TASS hedge-fund data and simulations of a speciﬁc long/short equity strategy, Khandani
and Lo (2007) hypothesized that the losses were initiated by the rapid “unwind” of one or
more sizable quantitative equity market-neutral portfolios. Given the speed and price impact
with which this occurred, we argued that it was likely the result of a forced liquidation by
a multi-strategy fund or proprietary-trading desk, possibly due to a margin call or a risk
reduction. These initial losses then put pressure on a broader set of long/short and long-only
equity portfolios, causing further losses by triggering stop/loss and deleveraging policies. A
signiﬁcant rebound of these strategies occurred on August 10th, which is also consistent with
the unwind hypothesis (see, also, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, 2007, and Rothman,
2007c).
In its conclusion, the Goldman Sachs Asset Management (2007) study suggests that
“...it is not clear that there were any obvious early warning signs... No one, however, could
possibly have forecasted the extent of deleveraging or the magnitude of last weeks factor
returns”. Our analysis suggests that the dislocation was exacerbated by the withdrawal of
marketmaking risk capital—possibly by high-frequency hedge funds—starting on August 8th.
This highlights the endogenous nature of liquidity risk and the degree of interdependence
among market participants, or “species” in the terminology of Farmer and Lo (1999). The
fact that the ultimate origins of this dislocation were apparently outside the long/short equity
sector—most likely in a completely unrelated set of markets and instruments—suggests that
systemic risk in the hedge-fund industry has increased signiﬁcantly in recent years.
In this paper, we turn our attention to the impact of quant factors before, during, and
after the Quant Meltdown, using a set of the most well-known factors from the academic
“anomalies” literature such as Banz (1981), Basu (1983), Bahandari (1988), and Jegadeesh
2See also Montier (2007).
5and Titman (1993). Although the evidence for some of these anomalies is subject to debate,3
nevertheless they have resulted in various multi-factor pricing models such as the widely cited
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. We limit our attention to ﬁve factors: three
value-factors similar to those in Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), and two momentum
factors as in Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996), and describe their construction in
Sections 3 and 4.
3 The Data
We use three sources of data for our analysis. Annual and quarterly balance-sheet informa-
tion from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database is used to create various valuation factors
for the members of the S&P 1500 index in 2007. To study market microstructure eﬀects,
we use the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) dataset from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
In addition, we use daily stock returns and volume from the University of Chicago’s Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to calculate the daily returns of various long/short
portfolios and their trading volumes. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 contain brief overviews of the
Compustat and TAQ datasets, respectively, and we provide details for the CRSP dataset
throughout the paper as needed.
3.1 Compustat Data
Balance-sheet information is obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database via
the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) platform. We use the “CRSP/Compustat
Merged Database” to map the balance-sheet information to CRSP historical stock returns
data. From the annual Compustat database, we use:
• Book Value Per Share (item code BKVLPS)
• Basic Earnings Per Share Excluding Extraordinary Items (item code EPSPX)
• Net Cashﬂow of Operating Activities (item code OANCF)
• Fiscal Cumulative Adjustment Factor (item code ADJEX F)
We also use the following variables from the quarterly Compustat database:
3See, for example, Fama and French (2006), Lewellen and Nagel (2006), and Ang and Chen (2007).
6• Quarterly Basic Earnings Per Share Excluding Extraordinary Items (item
code EPSPXQ)
• Cumulative Adjustment Factor by Ex-Date (item code ADJEX)
• Report Date of Quarterly Earnings (item code RDQ)
There is usually a gap between the end of the ﬁscal year or quarter and the date that the
information is available to the public. We implement the following rules to make sure any
information used in creating the factors is, in fact, available on the date that the factor is
calculated. For the annual data, a gap of at least 4 months is enforced (for example, an
entry with date of December 2005 is ﬁrst used starting in April 2006) and to avoid using old
data, we exclude data that are more than 1 year and 4 months old, i.e., if a security does
not have another annual data point after December 2005, that security is dropped from the
sample in April 2007). For the quarterly data, we rely on the date given in Compustat for
the actual reporting date (item code RDQ, Report Date of Quarterly Earnings) to ensure
that the data is available on the portfolio construction date. For the handful of cases that
RDQ is not available, we employ an approach similar to that taken for the annual data. In
those cases, to ensure that the quarterly data is available on the construction date and not
stale, the quarterly data is used with a 45-day gap and any data older than 135 days is not
used (for example, to construct the portfolio in April 2007, we use data from December 2006,
and January or February 2007, and do not use data from April or March 2007).
3.2 TAQ Transactions Data
The NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database contains intra-day transactions and quotes
data for all securities listed on the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), the
National Market System (NMS), and SmallCap issues. The dataset consists of the Daily
National Best Bids and Oﬀers (NBBO) File, the Daily Quotes File, the Daily TAQ Master
File, and the Daily Trades File. For the purposes of this study, we only use actual trades
as reported in the Daily Trades File. This ﬁle includes information such as the security
symbol, trade time, size, exchange on which the trade took place, as well as a few condition
and correction ﬂags. We only use trades that occur during normal trading hours (9:30am to
4:00pm). We also discarded all records that have a Trade Correction Indicator ﬁeld entries
7other than “00”4 and removed all trades that were reported late or reported out of sequence,
according to the Sale Condition ﬁeld.5 During the 63 trading days of our sample of TAQ
data from July 2, 2007 to September 28, 2007, the stocks within the universe of our study—
the S&P 1500—yielded a total of approximately 805 million trades, ranging from a low of
4.9 million trades on July 3, 2007 to a high of 23.7 million trades on August 16, 2007. The
cross-sectional variation of the number of trades was quite large; for example, there were
approximately 11 million trades in Apple (AAPL) during our sample period while Lawson
Products (LAWS) was only traded 6,830 times during the same period. On average, we
analyzed approximately 11.3 million trades per day to develop our liquidity measures.
Using transactions prices in the Daily Trades File, we construct 5-minute returns within
each trading day (no overnight returns are allowed) based on the most recent transactions
price within each 5-minute interval, subject to the ﬁlters described above. These returns are
the inputs to the various strategy simulations reported in Section 4 and 5. For the estimation
of price-impact coeﬃcients in Section 5.3, transactions prices are used, again subject to the
same ﬁlters described above.
4 Factor Portfolios
To study the Quant Meltdown of August 2007, we use the returns of several long/short equity
market-neutral portfolios based on the kinds of quantitative processes and factors that might
be used by quant funds. For example, it is believed that the value premium is a proxy for
a market-wide distress factor (see Fama and French, 1992).6 Fama and French (1995) note
that the typical value stock has a price that has been driven down due to ﬁnancial distress.
This observation suggests a direct explanation of the value premium: in the event of a credit
crunch, stocks in ﬁnancial distress will do poorly, and this is precisely when investors are
4According to the TAQ documentation, a Trade Correction Indicator value of “00” signiﬁes a regular
trade which was not corrected, changed or canceled. This ﬁeld is used to indicate trades that were later
signiﬁed as errors (code “07” or “08”), canceled records (code “10”), as well as several other possibilities.
Please see the TAQ documentation for more details.
5These ﬁlters have been used in other studies based on TAQ data; see, for example, Christie, Harris and
Schultz (1994) or Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001). See the TAQ documentation for further details.
6Kao and Shumaker (1999) document some intuitive links between macro factors and the return for value
stocks. Of course, the problem can be turned on its head and stock returns can be used to predict future
macro events, as in Liew and Vassalou (2000) and Vassalou (2003). Behavioral arguments are also used to
explain the apparent premium for the value factors (see Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994).
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NYSE Volume (5-Day Moving Average)￿
Figure 1: The cumulative daily returns for the Market, Small Minus Big (SMB), High Minus
Low (HML), Momentum factors as well as the contrarian strategy of Lehmann (1990) and
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) for January 3, 2007 to December 31, 2007. Data for Market,
SMB, HML and Momentum factors were obtained from Kenneth French’s website (please
see footnote 8 for details). The contrarian strategy was implemented as in Khandani and
Lo (2007) using daily return for stocks listed in the S&P 1500 on January 3, 2007. Volume
data was obtained from the NYSE website.
By simulating the returns of a portfolio formed to highlight such factors, we may be able
to trace out the dynamics of other portfolios with similar exposures to these factors. An
example of this approach is given in Figure 1, which contains the cumulative returns of the
Fama and French SMB and HML portfolios as well as a Price-Momentum factor portfolio
during 2007.8 Trading volume during this period also shows some unusual patterns, giving
some support to the Unwind Hypothesis mentioned above. During the week of July 23,
2007, volume began building to levels well above normal.9 The average volume during the
7One should note that the “distress” of an individual ﬁrm cannot be treated as a risk factor since such
distress is idiosyncratic and can be diversiﬁed away. Only aggregate events that a signiﬁcant portion of the
population of investors care about will result in a risk premium.
8Data was obtained from the data library section of Kenneth French’s web site:
http : //mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
Please refer to the documentation available from that site for further details.
9The ﬁrst day with extremely high volume is June 22, 2007, which was the re-balancing day for all Russell
9weeks of July 23, July 30, August 6, and August 13 reached record levels of 2.9, 3.0, 3.6, and
3.1 billion shares, respectively, before ﬁnally returning to a more normal level of 1.9 billion
shares during the week of August 20.
Figure 1 also displays the cumulative return of Lehmann’s (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay’s
(1990) short-term mean-reversion or “contrarian” strategy which was used by Khandani and
Lo (2007) to illustrate the Quant Meltdown of 2007.10 The sudden drop and recovery of
this strategy during the week of August 6th, following several weeks of lower than expected
performance, captures much of the dislocation during this period.
To develop some intuition for this dislocation, consider the underlying economic moti-
vation for the contrarian strategy. By taking long positions in stocks that have declined
and short positions in stocks that have advanced over the previous trading day, the strategy
actively provides liquidity to the marketplace.11 By implicitly making a bet on daily mean
reversion among a large universe of stocks, the strategy is exposed to any continuation or
persistence in the daily returns, i.e., price trends or momentum.12 Broad-based momentum
across a group of stocks can arise from a large-scale liquidation of a portfolio that may take
several days to complete, depending on the size of the portfolio and the urgency of the liq-
uidation. In short, the contrarian strategy under-performs when the usual mean reversion
in stock prices in replaced by a momentum, possibly due to a sizable and rapid liquidation.
We will elaborate on this theme in Section 5.1.
In Section 4.1, we describe ﬁve speciﬁc factors that we propose for capturing the events of
August 2007, and in Section 4.2 we present the simulations for these factor portfolios before,
during, and after the Quant Meltdown.
indexes, and a spike in volume was expected on this day because of the amount of assets invested in funds
tracking these indexes.
10Components of the S&P 1500 as of January 3, 2007 are used. Strategy holdings are constructed and the
daily returns are calculated based on the Holding Period Return from the CRSP daily returns ﬁle. See
Khandani and Lo (2007) for further details.
11By deﬁnition, losers are stocks that have under-performed relative to some market average, implying a
supply/demand imbalance in the direction of excess supply that has caused the prices of those securities to
drop, and vice-versa for the winners. By buying losers and selling winners, the contrarians are adding to the
demand for losers and increasing the supply of winners, thereby stabilizing supply/demand imbalances.
12Note that positive proﬁts for the contrarian strategy may arise from sources other than mean reversion.
For example, positive lead-lag relations across stocks can yield contrarian proﬁts (see Lo and MacKinlay,
1990 for details).
104.1 Factor Construction
We focus our analysis on ﬁve of the most studied and most highly cited quantitative equity
valuation factors: three value measures, Price Momentum, and Earnings Momentum. The
three value measures, Book-to-Market, Earnings-to-Price, and Cashﬂow-to-Market, are sim-
ilar to the factors discussed in Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994). These factors are
based on the most recent annual balance-sheet data from Compustat and constructed ac-
cording to the procedure described below. The two remaining factors—Price Momentum and
Earnings Momentum—have been studied extensively in connection with momentum strate-
gies (see for example Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996). The Earnings Momentum
factor is based on quarterly earnings from Compustat, while the Price Momentum factor
is based on the reported monthly returns from the CRSP database. At the end of each
month, each of these ﬁve factors is computed for each stock in the S&P 1500 index using
the following procedure:
1. The Book-to-Market factor is calculated as the ratio of the Book Value Per Share
(item code BKVLPS in Compustat) reported in the most recent annual report (subject
to the availability rules outlined in Section 3.1) divided by the closing price on the last
day of the month. Share adjustment factor from CRSP and Compustat are used to
correctly reﬂect changes in the number of outstanding common shares.
2. The Earnings-to-Price factor is calculate based on the Basic Earnings Per Share
Excluding Extraordinary Items (item code EPSPX in Compustat) reported in the
most recent annual report (subject to the availability rules outlined in Section 3.1)
divided by the closing price on the last day of the month. Share adjustment factor
available in CRSP and Compustat are used to correctly reﬂect stock splits and other
changes in the number of outstanding common shares.
3. The Cashﬂow-to-Market factor is calculated based on the Net Cashﬂow of Operat-
ing Activities (item code OANCF in Compustat) reported in the most recent annual
data (subject to the availability rules outlined in Section 3.1) divided by the total mar-
ket cap of common equity on the last day of the month. Number of shares outstanding
and the closing price reported in CRSP ﬁles are used to calculate the total market
11value of common equity.
4. The Price Momentum factor is the stock’s cumulative total return (calculated using
holding period return from CRSP ﬁles which includes dividends) over the period span-
ning the previous 2 to 12 months.13
5. The Earnings-Momentum factor is constructed based Quarterly Basic Earnings Per
Share Excluding Extraordinary Item (item code EPSPXQ in Compustat) using
the standardized unexpected earnings, SUE. The SUE factor is calculated as the ratio
of the earnings growth in the most recent quarter (subject the availability rules outlined
in Section 3.1) relative to the year earlier divided by the standard deviation of the same
factor calculated over the prior 8 quarters (see Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996,
for a more detailed discussion of this factor).
At the end of each month during our sample period, we divide the S&P 1500 universe into
10 deciles according to each factor. Decile 1 will contain the group of companies with the
lowest value of the factor; for example, companies whose stocks have performed poorly in
the last 2 to 12 month will be in the ﬁrst decile of the Price Momentum factor. Deciles 1
through 9 will have the same number of stocks and decile 10 may have a few more if the
original number of stocks was not divisible by 10. We do not require a company to have
data for all ﬁve factors or to be a U.S. common stock to be used in each ranking. However,
we use only those stocks that are listed as U.S. common shares (CRSP Share Code “10”
or “11”) to construct portfolios and analyze returns.14 For example, if a company does not
have 8 quarters of earnings data, it cannot be ranked according to the Earnings Momentum
factor, but it will still be ranked according to other measures if the information required for
calculating those measures is available.
This process yields decile rankings for each of these factors for each month of our sample.
In most months, we have the data to construct deciles for more than 1,400 companies.
However, at the time we obtained the Compustat data for this analysis, the Compustat
13The most recent month is not included, similar to the Price-Momentum factor available on Kenneth
French’s data library (see footnote 8).
14This procedure should not impact our analysis materially as there are only 50 to 60 stocks in the
S&P indexes without these share codes, and these are typically securities with share code “12”, indicating
companies incorporated outside the U.S.
12database was still not fully populated with the 2007 quarterly data; in particular, the data
for the quarter ending September 2007 (2007Q3) was very sparse. Given the 45-day lag
we employ for quarterly data, the lack of data for 2007Q3 means that the deciles can be
formed for only about 370 companies at the end of November 2007 (the comparable count
was 1,381 in October 2007 and 1,405 at the end of September 2007). Since any analysis of
factor models for December 2007 is impacted by this issue, we will limit all our study to the
ﬁrst 11 months of 2007.
Given the decile rankings of the ﬁve factors, we can simulate the returns of portfolios
based on each of these factors. In particular, for each of the ﬁve factors, at the end of each
month in our sample period, we construct a long/short portfolio by investing $1 long in the
stocks in the 10th decile and investing $1 short in the stocks in the 1st decile of that month.
Each $1 investment is distributed using equal weights among stocks in the respective decile
and each portfolio is purchased at the closing price on the last trading day of the previous
month. For the daily analysis, the cumulative return is calculated using daily returns based
on the Holding Period Return available from CRSP daily returns ﬁles. For the intra-
day return analysis, we compute the value of long/short portfolios using the most recent
transactions price in each 5-minute interval based on TAQ Daily Trades File (see Section 3.2
for details). We use the Cumulative Factor to Adjust Price (CFACPR) from the CRSP
daily ﬁles to adjust for stock splits, but do not adjust for dividend payments.15 Each portfolio
is rebalanced on the last trading day of each month, and a new portfolio is constructed. For
a few rare cases where a stock stops trading during the month, we assume that the ﬁnal
value of the initial investment in that stock is kept in cash for the remainder of the month.
4.2 Market Behavior in 2007
Figure 2 contains the daily cumulative returns for each of the ﬁve factors in 2007 through
the end of November. The results are consistent with the patterns in Figure 1—the three
value factors began their downward drift at the start of July 2007, consistent with the HML
15Our intra-day returns are unaﬀected by dividend payments, hence our analysis of marketmaking proﬁts
and price-impact coeﬃcients should be largely unaﬀected by omitting this information. However, when we
compute cumulative returns for certain strategies that involve holding overnight positions, small approxi-
mation errors may arise from the fact that we do not take dividends into account when using transacations
data.
13factor-portfolio returns in Figure 1. On the other hand, the two momentum factors were the
two best performers over the second half of 2007, again consistent with Figure 1. Also, the
two momentum factors and the Cashﬂow-to-Market portfolio experienced very large drops
and subsequent reversals during the second week of August 2007.
Of course, secular declines and advances of factor portfolios need not have anything to
do with deleveraging or unwinding; they may simply reﬂect changing market valuations of
value stocks, or trends and reversals that arise from typical market ﬂuctuations. To establish
a link between the movements of the ﬁve factor portfolios during July and August 2007 and
the Unwind Hypothesis, we perform two cross-sectional regressions each day from January
to November 2007 using daily stock returns and turnover as the dependent variables:
Ri,t = αt +
5  
f=1
βf,tDi,f + ǫi,t (1a)
TOi,t = γt +
5  
f=1
δf,t|Di,f − 5.5| + ηi,t (1b)
where Ri,t is the return for security i on day t, Di,f is the decile ranking of security i according
to factor f,16 and TOi,t, the turnover for security i on day t, is deﬁned as:17
TOi,t ≡
Number of Shares Traded for Security i on Day t
Number of Share Outstanding for Security i on Day t
. (2)
If, as we hypothesize, there was a signiﬁcant unwinding of factor-based portfolios in July and
August 2007, the explanatory power of these two cross-sectional regressions should spike up
during those months because of the overwhelming price-impact and concentrated volume of
the unwind. If, on the other hand, it was business as usual, then the factors should not have
any additional explanatory power during that period than any other period.
The lower part of Figure 2 displays the R2’s for the regressions (1) each day during the
16Note the decile rankings change each month, and they are time dependent, but we have suppressed the
time subscript for notational simplicity.
17Turnover is the appropriate measure for trading activity in each security because it normalizes the
number of shares traded by the number of shares outstanding (see Lo and Wang, 2000, 2006). The values of
the decile rankings are reﬂected around the “neutral” level for the turnover regressions because stocks that
belong to either of the extreme deciles—deciles 1 and 10—are “equally attractive” according to each of the
ﬁve factors (but in opposite directions), and should exhibit “abnormal” trading during those days on which







































Return Regression RSQ (5-Day Moving Average)￿
Turnover Regression RSQ (5-Day Moving Average)￿
Figure 2: Cumulative performance of ﬁve long/short equity market-neutral portfolios con-
structed from commonly used equity-valuation factors, from January 3, 2007 to December
31, 2007. Also plotted are daily R2’s and their 5-day moving averages of the following
cross-sectional regressions of returns and turnover: Ri,t = αt +
 5
f=1 βf,tDi,f + ǫi,t, and
TOi,t = γt +
 5
f=1 δf,t|Di,f − 5.5| + ηi,t, where Ri,t is the return for security i on day t, Di,f
is the decile ranking of security i according to factor f, and TOi,t, the turnover for security
i on day t, is deﬁned as the ratio of the number of shares traded to the shares outstanding.
15sample period. To smooth the sampling variation of these R2’s, we also display their 5-day
moving average. These plots conﬁrms that starting in late July, the turnover regression’s R2
increased signiﬁcantly, exceeding 10% in early August. Moreover, the turnover-regression
R2 continued to exceed 5% for the last three months of the our sample, a threshold that was
not passed at any point prior to July 2007.
As expected, the daily return regressions typically have lower R2’s, but at the same point
in August 2007, the explanatory power of this regression also spiked above 10%, adding
further support to the Unwind Hypothesis.
4.3 Evidence from Transactions Data
To develop a better sense of the market dynamics during August 2007, we construct the intra-
day returns of long/short market-neutral portfolios based on the factors of Section 4.1 for
the two weeks before and after August 6th. Figure 3 displays the cumulative returns of these
portfolios from 9:30am on July 23rd to 4:00pm on August 17th. These patterns suggest that
on August 2nd and 3rd, long/short portfolios based on Book-to-Market, Cashﬂow-to-Market,
and Earnings-to-Price were being unwound, while portfolios based on Price Momentum and
Earnings Momentum were unaﬀected until August 8th and 9th when they also experienced
sharp losses. But on Friday, August 10th, sharp reversals in all ﬁve strategies erased nearly
all of the losses of the previous four days, returning portfolio values back to their levels on
the morning of August 6th.
Of course, this assumes that portfolio leverage did not change during this tumultuous
week, which is an unlikely assumption given the enormous losses during the ﬁrst few days.
If, for example, a portfolio manager had employed a leverage ratio of 8:1 for the Book-to-
Market portfolio on the morning of August 1st, he would have experienced a cumulative loss
of 24% by the close of August 7th, which is likely to have triggered a reduction in leverage
at that time if not before. With reduced leverage, the Book-to-Market portfolio would not
have been able to recoup all of its losses, despite the fact that prices did revert back to their
beginning-of-week levels by the close of August 10th.
To obtain a more precise view of the trading volume during this period, we turn to the
cross-sectional regression (1) of individual turnover data of Section 4.2 on exposures to decile
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Figure 3: Cumulative returns for long/short portfolios based on ﬁve equity-valuation factors
from 9:30am July 23, 2007 to 4:00pm August 17, 2007 computed from 5-minute returns using
TAQ transactions data. Portfolios were rebalanced at the end of July 2007 to reﬂect the new
factors rankings. Note that these returns are constructed under the assumption that only
Reg-T leverage is used (see Khandani and Lo, 2007, for further details).
17of turnover for a unit of diﬀerence in the decile ranking; for example, an estimated coeﬃcient
of 25 basis points for a given factor implies that ceteris paribus, stocks in the 10th decile of













































Figure 4: Estimated coeﬃcients ˆ δf,t and R2 of the cross-sectional regression of daily
individual-stock turnover on absolute excess decile rankings for ﬁve valuation factors from
July 23, 2007 to August 17, 2007: TOi,t = ˆ γt +
 5
f=1 |Di,f −5.5|ˆ δf,t + ˆ ǫi,t, where TOi,t is the
turnover for stock i on day t and Di,f is the decile assignment for stock i based on factor
f, where the ﬁve factors are: Book-to-Market, Cashﬂow-to-Market, Earnings-to-Price, Price
Momentum, and Earnings Momentum.
Figure 4 displays the estimated turnover impact ˆ δf,t and R2 of the daily cross-sectional
regressions, which clearly shows the change in the trading activity and R2 among stocks
with extreme exposure to these ﬁve factors. The estimated coeﬃcients are always positive,
implying that the securities ranked as “attractive” or “unattractive” according to each of
these measures, i.e., deciles 10 and 1, respectively, tend to have a higher turnover than
the securities that are ranked “neutral” (deciles 5 or 6). Figure 4 shows that there was a
substantial jump in the Price Momentum coeﬃcient on August 8th, which coincides with
the start of the steep losses shown in Figure 3.
The coeﬃcients for the other factors also exhibit increases during this period, along with
the R2’s of the cross-sectional regressions, consistent with the Unwind Hypothesis. However,
the explanatory power of these regressions and the estimated impact of the factors (other
18than Price Momentum) on August 8th and 9th were not markedly diﬀerent than earlier in
the same week.
What changed on August 8th, 9th, and 10th that yielded the volatility spike in Figure 2?
We argue in the next section that a sudden withdrawal of liquidity may be one explanation.
5 Measures of Market Liquidity
In Section 4, we have provided suggestive but indirect evidence supporting the Unwind
Hypothesis for factor-based portfolios during the months of July and August 2007, but this
still leaves unanswered the question of what happened during the second week of August.
To address this issue head-on, in this section we focus on changes in market liquidity during
2007, and ﬁnd evidence of a sharp temporary decline in liquidity during the second week of
August 2007.
To measure equity-market liquidity, we begin in Section 5.1 by analyzing the contrarian
trading strategy of Lehmann (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990) from a marketmaking
perspective, i.e., the provision of immediacy. Using analytical and empirical arguments, we
conclude that marketmaking proﬁts have declined substantially over the past decade, which
is consistent with the common wisdom that increased competition—driven by a combination
of technological and institutional innovations—has resulted in greater liquidity and a lower
premium for liquidity provision services. We conﬁrm this conjecture in Section 5.2 by esti-
mating the price impact of equity trades using daily returns from 1995 to 2007, which shows
a substantial increase in market depth , i.e. a reduction in the price impact of trades, in
recent years. Markets were indeed much more liquid at the beginning of 2007 compared to
just ﬁve years earlier. However, using transactions data for the months of July, August, and
September 2007, in Section 5.3 we document a sudden and signiﬁcant decrease in market
liquidity in August 2007. And in Section 5.4, we use these tools to detect the exact date and
time that the Meltdown started, and even the initial groups of securities that were involved.
5.1 Marketmaking and Contrarian Proﬁts
The motivation behind the empirical analysis of this section can be understood in the con-
text of Grossman and Miller’s (1988) model. In that framework, there are two types of
19market participants—marketmakers and outside customers—and the provision of liquid-
ity and immediacy by the marketmakers to randomly arriving outside customers generates
mean-reverting prices. However, as observed by Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993),
when the price of a security changes, the change in price is partly due to new fundamental
information about the security’s value, and partly due to temporary supply/demand imbal-
ances. Although the latter yields mean-reverting prices, the former is typically modeled as a
random walk where shocks are “permanent” in terms of the impulse-response function. To
understand the role of liquidity in the Quant Meltdown of 2007, we need to separate these
components.
Because the nature of liquidity provision is inherently based on mean reversion, i.e.,
buying losers and selling winners, the the contrarian strategy of Lehmann (1990) and Lo and
MacKinlay (1990) is ideally suited for this purpose. As Khandani and Lo (2007) showed, a
contrarian trading strategy applied to daily U.S. stock returns is able to trace out the market
dislocation in August 2007, and in this section, we provide an explicit analytical explication
of their results in the context of marketmaking and liquidity provision.
The contrarian strategy consists of an equal dollar amount of long and short positions
across N stocks, where at each rebalancing interval, the long positions consist of “losers”
(past underperforming stocks, relative to some market average) and the short positions con-
sist of “winners” (past outperforming stocks, relative to the same market average). Speciﬁ-










for some k > 0. Observe that the portfolio weights are the negative of the degree of out-
performance k periods ago, so each value of k yields a somewhat diﬀerent strategy. As
in Khandani and Lo (2007), we set k = 1 day. By buying yesterday’s losers and selling
yesterday’s winners at each date, such a strategy actively bets on one-day mean reversion
across all N stocks, proﬁting from reversals that occur within the rebalancing interval. For
this reason, (3) has been called a “contrarian” trading strategy that beneﬁts from market
overreaction, i.e., when underperformance is followed by positive returns and vice-versa for
outperformance (see Khandani and Lo, 2007 for further details). A more ubiquitous source
20of proﬁtability for this strategy is the fact that liquidity is being provided to the market-
place, and investors are implicitly paying a fee for this service, both through the bid/oﬀer
spread and from price reversals as in the Grossman and Miller (1988) model. Historically,
designated marketmakers such as the NYSE/AMEX specialists and NASDAQ dealers have
played this role, but in recent years, hedge funds and proprietary trading desks have begun to
compete with traditional marketmakers, adding enormous amounts of liquidity to U.S. stock
markets and earning attractive returns for themselves and their investors in the process.
One additional subtlety in interpreting the proﬁtability of the contrarian strategy (3) is
the role of the time horizon over which the strategy’s proﬁts are deﬁned. Because the demand
for immediacy arises at diﬀerent horizons, disentangling liquidity shocks and informed trades
can be challenging. All else equal, if marketmakers reduce the amount of capital they are
willing to deploy, the price impact of a liquidity trade will be larger, and the time it takes for
prices to revert back to their fundamental levels after such a trade will increase. To capture
this phenomenon, we propose to study the expected proﬁts of the contrarian trading strategy
for various holding periods. In particular, consider a strategy based on the portfolio weights
(3) but where the positions are held ﬁxed for q periods. The proﬁts for such a q-period











The properties of E[πt(q)] under general covariance-stationary return-generating processes
are summarized in the following proposition (see Appendix A.1 for the derivations):
Proposition 1 Consider a collection of N securities and denote by Rt the (N×1)-vector
of their period t returns, [R1,t    RN,t]′. Assume that Rt is a jointly covariance-stationary
stochastic process with expectation E[Rt] ≡ µ ≡ [ 1     N]′ and autocovariance matrices
E[(Rt−l −µ)(Rt − µ)′] ≡ Γl ≡ [γi,j(l)]. Consider a zero net-investment strategy that invests
ωi,t dollars given by (3) in security i. The expected proﬁts over q periods, E[πt(q)], is given
18This expression is an approximation since the return of security i in period t, Ri,t, is deﬁned to be a
simple return, and log of the sum is not equal to the sum of the logs. The approximation error is typically
small, especially for short holding periods of just a few days.
21by:
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and ι is an (N×1)-vector of ones.
If mean reversion implies that contrarian trading strategies will be proﬁtable, then price
momentum implies the reverse. In the presence of return persistence, i.e., positively auto-
correlated returns, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) show that the contrarian trading strategy (3)
will exhibit negative proﬁts. As with other marketmaking strategies, the contrarian strategy
loses when prices exhibit trends, either because of private information, which the market
microstructure literature calls “adverse selection”, or a sustained liquidation in which the
marketmaker bears the losses by taking the other side and losing value as prices move in re-
sponse to the liquidation. We shall argue below that this can explain the anomalous pattern
of losses during the second week of August 2007.
To develop this argument further, suppose that stock returns satisfy the following simple
linear multivariate factor model:
Ri,t =  i + βiνt + λi,t + ηi,t (7a)
λi,t = θiλi,t−1 − ǫi,t + ǫi,t−1 , θi ∈ (0,1) (7b)
νt = ρνt−1 + ζt , ρ ∈ (−1,1) (7c)
where ǫi,t, ζt, and ηi,t are white-noise random variables that are uncorrelated at all leads and
lags.
The impact of random idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks are represented by ǫi,t, and
λi,t is the reduced-form expression of the interaction between public orders and marketmakers
22over the cumulative history of ǫi,t’s. In particular, the reduced form (7) is an ARMA(1,1)
process that exhibits negative autocorrelation to capture the mean reversion generated by
marketmaking activity (e.g., bid/ask bounce, as in Roll, 1984). To develop a better sense of
its time-series properties, we can express λi,t as the following inﬁnite-order moving-average
process:












iǫi,t−2 +     , θi ∈ (0,1) . (8)
Note that the coeﬃcients in (8) sum to zero so that the impact of each ǫi,t is temporary, and
the parameter θi controls the speed of mean reversion.
Market information is represented by the common factor νt, which can capture mean
reversion, noise, or momentum as ρ is less than, equal to, or greater than zero, respectively.
The error term ηi,t represents idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations in security i’s returns that are unre-
lated to liquidity or to common factors. The Appendix provides additional motivation and
intuition for this speciﬁcation.
By varying the parameters of the return-generating process (7), we can change the rel-
ative importance of fundamental shocks and marketmaking activity in determining security
i’s returns. For example, if we assume parameters that cause νt to dominate Ri,t, this cor-
responds to a set of market conditions where liquidity traders are of minor importance and
the common factor is the main driver of returns. If, on the other hand, the variability of νt is
small in comparison to λi,t, this corresponds to a market where liquidity traders are the main
drivers of returns. We shall see below that these two cases lead to very diﬀerent patterns
for the proﬁtability of the contrarian strategy (3), which raises the possibility of inferring
the relative importance of these two components by studying the empirical properties of
contrarian trading proﬁts. We perform this study below.
We now consider a few special cases of (7) to build the intuition and set the stage for the
empirical analysis.
Uncorrelated Returns
Let βi ≡ 0 and λi,t ≡ 0 in (7), implying that Rt is driven only by ﬁrm-speciﬁc idiosyncratic
shocks ηi,t that are both serially and cross-sectionally uncorrelated. In this case, Γl = 0 for
23all nonzero l; hence,
E[πt(q)] = −qσ
2(µ) < 0 . (9)
Returns are both serially and cross-sectionally uncorrelated, and the expected proﬁt is neg-
ative as long as there is some cross-sectional variation in expected returns. In this special
case, the contrarian strategy involves shorting stocks with higher expected return and buying
stocks with lower expected return, which yields a negative expected return that is linear in
the holding period q and the cross-sectional variance of the individual securities’ expected
returns.
Idiosyncratic Liquidity Shocks
Let ρ ≡ 0 in (7) so that the common factor is serially uncorrelated. The expected q-period














In this case, the strategy beneﬁts from correctly betting on mean reversion in λi,t but again
loses a small amount due to the cross-sectional dispersion of expected returns. For a ﬁxed
holding period q, the expected proﬁt is an increasing function of the volatility σ2
λi of the
liquidity component, and a decreasing function of the speed of mean reversion, θi, which
is consistent with our intuition for the returns to marketmaking. Moreover, as long as the
cross-sectional dispersion of expected returns, σ2(µ), is not too large, the expected proﬁt
will be an increasing and concave function of the length of the holding period, q.
Common-Factor and Idiosyncratic Liquidity Shocks
Now suppose that ρ  = 0 in (7), so that the common factor is autocorrelated. In this case,




















24In contrast to (10), when ρ  = 0 the contrarian strategy can proﬁt or lose from the common
factor (depending on the sign of ρ) if there is any cross-sectional dispersion in the common-
factor betas βi. If the common factor is negatively serially correlated, i.e., ρ < 0, then the
ﬁrst two terms of (11) are unambiguously positive. In this case, mean reversion in both the
common and liquidity components both contribute positively to expected proﬁts.
If, however, the common-factor component exhibits momentum, i.e., ρ > 0, then the
ﬁrst two terms in (11) are of opposite sign. By buying losers and selling winners, the
contrarian strategy (3) proﬁts from mean-reverting liquidity shocks λi,t but suﬀers losses
from momentum in the common factor. For suﬃciently large ρ and large cross-sectional
variability in the βi’s, the second term of (11) can dominate the ﬁrst, yielding negative
expected proﬁts for the contrarian strategy over all holding periods q.
However, if ρ is small and positive, (11) yields an interesting relation between expected
proﬁts and the holding period q—the contrarian strategy can exhibit negative expected
proﬁts over short holding periods due to momentum in the common factor, and yield positive
expected proﬁts over longer holding periods as the inﬂuence of the common factor decays
and as the liquidity term grows with q.19 To see this possibility more directly, consider the
following simpliﬁcations: let θi = θ and σ2
λi = σ2
λ for all i, σ2(µ) ≈ 0, and assume that N


















Figure 5 plots the normalized expected proﬁt (12) as a function of the common factor’s
autocorrelation coeﬃcient ρ and the holding period q, assuming the following values for the
19Of course, for (11) to be positive, the liquidity term must dominate both the common-factor term as well
as the cross-sectional variability in expected returns. However, since this latter component is independent

















Figure 5 shows that the expected proﬁt is always increasing and concave in the holding
period, q. While mean reversion in the common factor increases the expected proﬁts of
the strategy, for suﬃciently large momentum, i.e. positive ρ, the expected proﬁts becomes
negative for all holding periods. The more interesting intermediate region is one in which
expected proﬁts are negative for short holding periods, but becomes positive if positions are
held for a suﬃciently long period of time. This pattern will be particularly relevant in light
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= 50, σ2(β) = 1/16, and θ = 1/2, as a function of
the serial correlation coeﬃcient of the common factor, ρ, and the holding period q.
20These calibrations are arbitrary, but the motivation for the value of σ2
ν/σ2
λ is the importance of the
common factor during the Quant Meltdown, and the motivation for the value of σ2(β) is that 95% of the
betas will fall between plus and minus 0.5 of its mean if they are normally distributed with a variance of
1/16.
26Empirical Results
We now apply the contrarian strategy (3) to historical U.S. stock returns from January
3, 1995 to December 31, 2007. As in Lehmann (1990), Lo and MacKinlay (1990), and
Khandani and Lo (2007), we expect to ﬁnd positive expected proﬁts for short-term holding
periods (small values of q), and the expected proﬁts should be increasing in q but at a
decreasing rate, given the timed decay implicit in liquidity provision and its implied mean
reversion.21 By construction, the weights for the contrarian strategy (3) sum to zero, hence
the return of the strategy is ill-deﬁned. We follow Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and the practice
of most equity market-neutral managers in computing the return of this strategy Rp,t each
period t by dividing each period’s dollar proﬁt or loss by the total capital It required to
generate that proﬁt or loss, hence






where πt(q) is given by (4).22
Figure 6 displays the average return of the contrarian strategy when applied to compo-
nents of S&P 1500 index between January 1995 to December 2007.23 When averaged over
the entire sample, the results conﬁrm that the average return increases in the holding period
q and, as predicted, increases at a decreasing rate. Even though the average return remains
generally an increasing function of the holding period, its absolute level has decreased over
time. For example, the average return for years prior to 2002 are all above the full-sample
average in Figure 6 and in the years 2002 and after, they are below the full-sample aver-
age. This pattern is consistent with the common intuition that increased competition and
technological innovations in the equity markets have reduced the proﬁtability of such mar-
21Note that as a matter of convention, we date the multi-holding-period return Rt(q) as of the date t on
which the positions are established, not the date on which the positions are closed out and the return is
realized, which is date t+q.
22This expression for Rt(q) implicitly assumes that the portfolio satisﬁes Regulation-T leverage, which is $1
long and $1 short for every $1 of capital. However, most equity market-neutral managers used considerably
greater leverage just prior to August 2007, and returns should be multiplied by the appropriate leverage
factor when comparing properties of this strategy between 2007 and earlier years. See Khandani and Lo
(2007) for further discussion.
23The S&P indexes are based on the last day of the previous month and not changed through out each
month. Plots based on strategy proﬁts, πt(q), are qualitatively the same but the values are harder to interpret
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Figure 6: Average return of the contrarian strategy when portfolios are constructed based on
1-day lagged returns and positions are held for 1 to 10 days for January 3, 1995 to December
31, 2007. A return is assigned to the year in which the position was established and averages
are then calculated for diﬀerent holding periods. Components of the S&P 1500 are based on
memberships as of the last day of the previous month.
ketmaking activity. The decline in proﬁtability also suggests that U.S. equity markets may
be more liquid now than a decade ago, and we will conﬁrm this conjecture in the next section
by studying the link between trading volume and price changes.
5.2 Market Liquidity: 1995 to 2007
Many methods have been suggested for measuring liquidity in ﬁnancial markets. For exam-
ple, volume is used in Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), quoted bid-ask spreads
and depths are used in Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000), and the ratio of absolute
stock returns to dollar volume is proposed by Amihud (2002).24 Because the days leading up
to August 2007 exhibited unusually high volume (see Figure 1), any volume-based measure
is not likely to capture the full extent of illiquidity during that time. Instead, we take an ap-
proach motivated by Kyle’s (1985) model in which liquidity is measured by a linear-regression
24See Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2005) and Hasbrouck (2007) for a comprehensive discussion of
diﬀerent theoretical and empirical aspects of liquidity with an overview of most relevant studies in this area.
28estimate of the volume required to move the price by one dollar.25 Sometimes referred to as
“Kyle’s lambda”, this measure is an inverse proxy of liquidity, with higher values of lambda
implying lower liquidity and lower market depth. From an empirical perspective, this is
a better measure of liquidity than quoted depth since it captures undisclosed liquidity not
reﬂected in the best available quotes, and correctly reﬂects lower available depth if narrower
spreads come at the expense of smaller quantities available at the best bid and oﬀer prices.
We estimate this measure using daily returns for individual stocks each month from
January 1995 to December 2007. To be included in our sample, the stock must be in the
corresponding S&P index as of the last day of the previous month and have at least 15 days
of returns in that month. Given the sequence of daily returns, {Ri,1,Ri,2,   ,Ri,T}, closing
prices, {pi,1,pi,2,   ,pi,T}, and volumes, {vi,1,vi,2,   ,vi,T} for security i during a speciﬁc
month, we estimate the following regression:
Ri,t = ˆ ci + ˆ λi   Sgn(t)log(vi,tpi,t) + ǫi,t (14)
where Sgn(t) ≡ {+1 or −1} depending on the direction of the trade, i.e., “buy” or “sell”, as
determined according to the following rule: if Ri,t is positive we assign a +1 to that entire day
(to indicate net buying), and if Ri,t is negative we assign a −1 to the entire day (to indicate
net selling).26 Any day with zero return receives the same sign as that of the most recent
prior day with a non-zero return (using returns from the prior month, if necessary). Because
of evidence that the impact of trade size on price adjustment is concave (see, for example,
Hasbrouck, 1991, Dufour and Engle, 2000, and Bouchaud, Farmer, and Lillo, 2008), we use
the natural logarithm of trade size in our analysis. Days with zero volume were dropped from
the sample.27 The monthly cross-sectional average of the estimated price impact coeﬃcients,
 
i ˆ λi/N, then yields an aggregate measure of market liquidity. This approach is similar to
the aggregate liquidity measure of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).
25For examples of prior empirical work based on a similar measure, see Brennan and Subrahmanyam
(1996) and Anand and Weaver (2006), or Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) for a closely related measure.
26This approach is similar to the so-called “tick test” used in many studies of transactions data for signing
trades (see, for example, Cohen et al., 1986). We adopt this method since it can be applied easily to daily
returns. Some studies such as Finucane (2000) suggest that this method is the most reliable method for
determining whether a trade is buyer- or seller-initiated.





















Aggregate Liquidity ( Average of Price Impact in bps)￿
S&P 1500￿
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Figure 7: Monthly cross-sectional averages of price impact coeﬃcients ˆ λi of stocks in the S&P
1500 and sub-components between January 1995 and December 2007, based on daily time-
series regressions for each stock i within each month: Ri,t = ˆ ci + ˆ λi   Sgn(t)log(vi,tpi,t) + ǫi,t
where Sgn(t)log(vi,tpi,t) is the signed volume of security i on date t and the sign is determined
by “tick test” applied to daily returns. Components of these indexes are based on the
memberships on the last day of the previous month.
30Figure 7 graphs the time series of our aggregate price-impact measure, and shows that
equity markets are more liquid today than a decade ago, and have become progressively
more liquid over the past ﬁve years. The spikes in price impact correspond well with known
periods of uncertainty and illiquidity: the ﬁrst large spike starts in August 1998 and reaches
its highest level in October 1998 (the LTCM crisis), another spike occurs in March 2000
(the end of the Technology Bubble), a third occurs in September 2001 (the September 11th
terrorist attacks), and the most recent spike occurs in August 2007 (the Quant Meltdown).
Kyle’s (1985) framework yields a market-depth function that is decreasing in the level of
informed trading, hence it is no surprise that spikes in this measure coincide with periods of
elevated uncertainty about economic fundamentals, where trading activity is more likely to be
attributed to informed trading. However, the importance of the patterns in Figure 7 for our
purposes involves the systematic nature of liquidity. Studies such as Huberman and Halka
(2001), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000,2001)
have documented commonality in liquidity using diﬀerent measures and techniques. Chordia,
Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005) observe common liquidity shocks between equity and bond
markets. Perhaps motivated by some of these studies, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) propose
the sensitivity to a common liquidity factor as a risk measure in an asset-pricing framework.
But how does such commonality in liquidity arise?
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) argue that a common liquidity factor can
emerge from co-movements in optimal inventory levels of marketmakers, inventory carry-
ing costs, commonality in private information, and common investing styles shared by large
institutional investors. Carrying costs are considered explicitly in Chordia, Sarkar and Sub-
rahmanyam (2005) and are modeled by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008). These studies
suggest that the availability of credit and low carrying costs may have contributed to the
very low price-impact levels observed between 2003 and August 2007 (see, also, Brunner-
meier 2008). Institutional changes such as decimalization and technological advances are
also likely contributors to the overall trend of increasing liquidity over the past decade.
5.3 Market Liquidity in 2007
Having documented the historical behavior of marketmaking proﬁts and liquidity in Sections
5.1 and 5.2, we now turn our attention to the events of August 2007 by applying similar
31measures to transactions data from July to September 2007 for the stocks in the S&P 1500
universe.
For computational simplicity, we use a simpler mean-reversion strategy than the con-
trarian strategy (3) to proxy for marketmaking proﬁts. This high-frequency mean-reversion
strategy is based on buying losers and selling winners over lagged m-minute returns, where we
vary m from 5 to 60 minutes. Speciﬁcally, each trading day is broken into non-overlapping m-
minute intervals, and during each m-minute interval we construct a long/short dollar-neutral
portfolio that is long those stocks in the lowest return-decile over the previous m-minute
interval, and short those stocks in the highest return-decile over the previous m-minute in-
terval.28 The value of the portfolio is then calculated for the next m-minute holding period,
and this procedure is repeated for each of the non-overlapping m-minute intervals during the
day.29
Figure 8 plots the cumulative returns of this mean-reversion strategy from July 2 to
September 28, 2007 for various values of m, and a clear pattern emerges. For m=60 minutes,
the cumulative return is fairly ﬂat over the three-month period, but as the horizon shortens,
the slope increases, implying increasingly larger expected returns. This reﬂects the fact
that shorter-horizon mean reversion strategies are closer approximations to marketmaking,
with correspondingly more consistent proﬁts. However, for all values of m, we observe the
same dip in proﬁts during the second week of August. Consider, in particular, the case
where m = 5 minutes—on August 6th, the cumulative proﬁt levels oﬀ, and then declines
from August 7th through August 13th, after which it resumes its growth path at nearly the
same rate. This inﬂection period suggests that marketmakers may have reduced their risk
capital from August 7–13, returning to the market once the Quant Quake had passed. The
logic is straightforward: the existence of marketmakers typically provides a counterbalancing
force to attenuate such correlated liquidation-driven momentum among a large group of
stocks. Therefore, a sudden withdrawal of marketmaking capital in the face of mounting
price pressure would yield exactly the kind of price patterns observed over the week of
28Stocks are equal-weighted. In case there is a tie between returns for several securities that cross the
decile threshold, we ignore all securities with equal returns to focus on the supply-demand imbalance, and
also to enhance the reproducibility of our numerical results. No overnight positions are allowed.
29We always use the last traded price in each m-minute interval to calculate returns; hence, the ﬁrst set
of prices for each day are the prices based on trades just before 9:30am plus m minutes, and the ﬁrst set of
positions are established at 9:30am plus 2m minutes.
32August 6, 2007.
Although NYSE/AMEX specialists and NASDAQ dealers have an aﬃrmative obligation
to maintain orderly markets and stand ready to deal with the public, in recent years, a
number of hedge funds and proprietary trading desks have become de facto marketmakers by
engaging in high-frequency program-trading strategies that exploit mean reversion in intra-
daily stock prices.30 But in contrast to exchange-designated marketmakers, such traders are
under no obligation to make markets, and can cease trading without notice. We conjecture
that these traders may have left the market during the second week of August, either because
of losses sustained during the start of the week, or because they were forced to reduce their


































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Cumulative return of m-minute mean-reversion strategy applied to stocks in the
S&P 1500 universe from July 2, 2007 to September 28, 2007 for m = 5, 10, 15, 30, and 60
minutes. No overnight positions are allowed, initial positions are established at 9:30am plus
m minutes each day and all positions are closed at 4:00pm. Components of the S&P 1500
are based on memberships as of the last day of the previous month.
30The advent of decimalization in 2001 was a signiﬁcant factor in the growth of marketmaking strategies
by hedge funds because of the ability of such funds to “step in front of” designated marketmakers (achieve
price priority in posted bids and oﬀers) at much lower cost after decimalization, i.e., a penny versus 12.5
cents.
33To explore the impact of varying holding periods on marketmaking proﬁts, we use lagged
5-minute returns to establish the positions of the mean-reversion strategy, and hold those
positions for m minutes where m varies from 5 to 60 minutes, after which new positions are
established based on the most recent lagged 5-minute returns. This procedure is applied
for each day and average returns are computed for each week and each holding period, and
displayed in Figure 9. With the notable exception of the week of August 6th, the average
return is generally increasing in the length of holding period, consistent with the patterns in




























Figure 9: The average return for the contrarian strategy applied to 5-minute returns from
July 2, 2007 to September 28, 2007. Each day is divided into non-overlapping 5-minute
intervals, and positions are established based on lagged 5-minute returns and then held for
5, 10, 15, 30, or 60 minutes. The average return for each holding period is calculated for each
week during this sample. No overnight positions are allowed, initial positions are established
at 9:40am each day and all positions are closed at 4:00pm. Components of the S&P 1500
are based on memberships as of the last day of the previous month.
To interpret the observed patterns in Figure 9, recall that this mean-reversion strategy
provides immediacy by buying losers and selling winners every 5 minutes. As quantitative
factor portfolios were being deleveraged and unwound during the last two weeks of July 2007,
34the price for immediacy presumably increased, implying higher proﬁts for marketmaking
strategies such as ours. This is conﬁrmed in Figure 9. However, during the week of August
6, 2007, the average return to our simpliﬁed mean-reversion strategy turned sharply negative,
with larger losses for longer holding periods that week. This pattern is consistent with the
third special case of Proposition 1 in Section 5.1—a trending common factor and mean
reversion in the idiosyncratic liquidity factor. In particular, the pattern of losses in Figure
9 supports the Unwind Hypothesis in which sustained liquidation pressure for a suﬃciently
large subset of securities created enough price pressure to overcome the proﬁtability of our
short-term mean-reversion strategy, resulting in negative returns for holding periods from 5
minutes to 60 minutes.
To distinguish between the unwinding of factor portfolios and the withdrawal of mar-
ketmaking capital, in Table 1 we compute the performance of the short-term marketmaking
strategy based on 5-minute returns for holding periods from 5 minutes to 1 hour (Panel A),
and based on daily returns for holding periods from 1 to 5 days (Panel B). Recall that this
strategy can be viewed as providing immediacy to the market at regular intervals (every
5 minutes or every day). Accordingly, the strategy will suﬀer losses if information ﬂows
generate price trends over intervals that match or exceed the typical holding period of the
marketmaker.
Panel A of Table 1 indicates that even as early as Monday, August 6th, the deleveraging
that began earlier (see Figure 2) seems to have overwhelmed the amount of marketmaking
capital available, and prices began exhibiting momentum during the day. This situation
became more severe on August 8th, implying that marketmakers may have reduced their
risk exposure after having observed the unusual trading and price patterns earlier in the
week. By reducing their exposure, marketmakers reduced the stabilizing inﬂuence of their
trading activity in the face of mounting price pressure from unwinding portfolios, which
greatly increased the price impact of the unwind. The entries in Panel B of 1 also show that
the premiums collected by those marketmakers on the 8th and 9th who were intrepid (and
well-capitalized) enough to hold their positions for ﬁve days would have earned unleveraged
returns of 8.20% and 8.96% from positions established on those two days, respectively. These
extraordinary returns are yet another indication of just how much dislocation occurred during
that fateful week.
35Date￿  5 Minutes￿ 10 Minutes￿ 15 Minutes￿ 30 Minutes￿ 60 Minutes￿
8/1/2007￿ 5.06￿ 6.81￿ 5.15￿ 8.02￿ 7.37￿
8/2/2007￿ 6.74￿ 6.97￿ 8.47￿ 9.48￿ 9.02￿
8/3/2007￿ 4.28￿ 2.93￿ 1.77￿ 1.47￿ -0.62￿
8/6/2007￿ -1.30￿ -2.57￿ -3.57￿ -8.75￿ -5.30￿
8/7/2007￿ -1.12￿ -6.32￿ -10.14￿ -14.55￿ -15.43￿
8/8/2007￿ -18.69￿ -31.60￿ -40.99￿ -56.82￿ -62.49￿
8/9/2007￿ -9.82￿ -16.86￿ -20.87￿ -27.65￿ -26.06￿
8/10/2007￿ -4.38￿ -11.41￿ -16.25￿ -25.15￿ -42.97￿
8/13/2007￿ -4.90￿ -10.29￿ -15.17￿ -23.18￿ -28.69￿
8/14/2007￿ 5.39￿ 7.72￿ 8.30￿ 10.12￿ 10.28￿
8/15/2007￿ 6.79￿ 8.96￿ 9.63￿ 8.46￿ 8.35￿
July Sigma￿ 1.58￿ 1.96￿ 2.15￿ 2.58￿ 3.53￿
1 Day￿ 2 Days￿ 3 Days￿ 4 Days￿ 5 Days￿
8/1/2007￿ 0.14￿ -1.03￿ -2.69￿ -2.57￿ -0.34￿
8/2/2007￿ -0.76￿ -1.62￿ -2.57￿ -2.63￿ -2.79￿
8/3/2007￿ -0.30￿ -0.57￿ 0.65￿ 0.29￿ 2.04￿
8/6/2007￿ -1.47￿ -1.79￿ -1.75￿ 1.24￿ 3.44￿
8/7/2007￿ -2.88￿ -4.49￿ 1.38￿ 4.00￿ 4.52￿
8/8/2007￿ -3.99￿ 3.79￿ 7.81￿ 8.31￿ 8.20￿
8/9/2007￿ 6.85￿ 10.12￿ 9.83￿ 9.47￿ 8.96￿
8/10/2007￿ -1.46￿ -1.71￿ -1.48￿ -1.84￿ -1.49￿
8/13/2007￿ 0.19￿ 0.82￿ 3.79￿ 4.61￿ 3.77￿
8/14/2007￿ -0.95￿ -0.83￿ 0.22￿ 0.34￿ 0.56￿
8/15/2007￿ -1.34￿ -0.58￿ 0.31￿ 0.76￿ 1.69￿
Jan. to Jul. 2007 Sigma￿ 0.36￿ 0.49￿ 0.59￿ 0.66￿ 0.69￿
Average Return (bps)￿
Total Holding Period Return (%)￿
Panel B: Daily Contrarian Strategy￿
Panel A: High-Frequency Contrarian Strategy￿
Construction Date￿
Table 1: Performance of the contrarian strategy applied to 5-minute and daily returns from
August 1 to 15, 2007. Each entry in Panel A shows the average return over the speciﬁed day
for the contrarian strategy applied to 5-minute returns when positions are held for 5, 10, 15,
30, or 60 minutes. Panel B shows the performance of the contrarian strategy based on daily
returns, with positions established based on stock returns on the “Construction Date”, and
positions are held for 1 to 5 days afterward.
36By August 10th, it seems that supply/demand imbalances returned to more normal
levels as the daily contrarian strategies started to recover on that day (see Table 1, Panel
B), presumably as new capital ﬂowed into the market to take advantage of opportunities
created by the previous days’ dislocation. For example, a daily contrarian portfolio based
on stock returns on August 6th suﬀered a 1.47% loss by the close of the market on the 7th,
and these losses continued for the next two days, reaching the high of 1.75% by the close of
the 9th. But there was a reversal on the 10th which continued through the 13th, resulting in
a cumulative proﬁt of 3.44% over the 5-day period. Daily contrarian portfolios constructed
on the 7th and 8th both suﬀered for two days and one day, respectively, but both recovered
on the 10th. In short, while prices trended intra-day (Panel A) and even over multiple days
(Panel B) during this week, they eventually reverted back to their beginning-of-week levels
by the 10th. While the managers that had the ability to stay fully invested for the duration
of this dislocation had recovered most, if not all, of their losses by Monday, August 13th (see
Figure 3), those marketmakers with suﬃcient capital and fortitude to hold their positions
throughout this period would have proﬁted handsomely. Not surprisingly, during periods of
extreme dislocation, liquidity becomes scarce and highly valued, hence those able to provide
liquidity stand to earn outsized returns.
It should be emphasized that the returns reported in these tables and ﬁgures are all
unleveraged (2 : 1 or Regulation-T leverage) returns. The volatility and drawdowns would
have been substantially higher for leveraged portfolios—for example, a portfolio with 8 : 1
leverage and constructed based on the Price Momentum factor would have lost about 31% of
its value over the two-day period from August 8th to the 9th! And as argued by Khandani
and Lo (2007), the use of leverage ratios ranging from 4:1 to 10:1 was quite common among
quantitative equity market-neutral strategies, where the higher leverage ratios were used by
those managers engaged in high-frequency mean-reversion strategies because those strategies
exhibited the lowest volatilities and highest Sharpe ratios.
To obtain a more concrete measure of changes in liquidity during this period, we estimate
a price-impact model according to (14) but using transactions volume and prices.31 To focus
on the change in market liquidity during this period, in Figure 10 we display the relative
31We use only those transactions that occur during normal trading hours, and discard all trades that are
reported late, out of sequence, or have a non-zero correction ﬁeld (see Section 3.2 for further details).
37increase in our price-impact measure as compared to its value on July 2, 2007 (the ﬁrst day
of our sample of transactions data). The empirical evidence suggests that relative increases
in price impact was common to all market-cap groups and not limited to the smaller stocks.
Note that the speciﬁcation given in (14) uses the natural logarithm of transactions dollar
volume as a regressor, hence a relative increase of 1.5 (which ﬁrst occurred on July 26, 2007)
indicates a very large increase in trading costs, implying, for example, that trading 100 shares
of a stock at price of $50/share on July 26th—a total dollar volume of $5000—would have



















Relative Increase in Price Impact ￿
(Base Date: July, 2 2007)￿
S&P 1500￿
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Figure 10: The relative increase in the estimated price impact ˆ λi based on transactions
data regression estimates for each day from July 2, 2007 to September 28, 2007. Using
all transactions data for each security on each day, the following price-impact equation is
estimated: Ri,t = ˆ ci+ˆ λi Sgn(t)log(vi,tpi,t)+ǫi,t where Sgn(t)log(vi,tpi,t) is the signed volume
of trade t in security i, where sign is determined by “tick test”. The relative increase in the
average of all ˆ λi for each day, using July 2, 2007 (the ﬁrst day of our sample) as the base,
is then calculated as a measure of the relative decrease in market depth. Components of
various S&P indexes as of the last day of the previous month are used.
Although Figure 9 shows that short-term marketmaking proﬁts did not turn negative until
the second week of August, the pattern of price impact displayed in Figure 10 documents a
substantial drop in liquidity in the days leading up to August 6, 2007. Given the increased
38trading activity in factor-based portfolios as documented in Figure 2, sustained pressure
on market makers’ inventory levels due to the unwinding of correlated investment portfolios
seems to be the most likely explanation for such a large increase in the price impact of trades
during this time.32
5.4 Determining the Epicenter of the Quake
When applied to transactions data, the contrarian strategy can be used to pinpoint the
origins of the Quant Meltdown even more precisely. In particular, we apply the contrarian
strategy to the following subsets of stocks: three market-cap based subsets (Small-,Mid-,
and Large-Cap subsets representing the bottom 30%, middle 40% and top 30% of stocks by
market capitalization), ﬁve factor-based subsets (each subset consists of stocks in either decile
1 or decile 10 of each of the ﬁve quantitative factors of Section 4), and six industry based
subsets, based on the twelve-industry classiﬁcation codes available from Kenneth French’s
website.33 To each of these subsets, we apply the simpler version of the contrarian strategy
described in Section 5.3.
Table 2 and Figure 11 contain the returns of these portfolios from July 23rd to August
17th, the two weeks before and after August 6th. Each entry in Table 2 is the average
return of the 5-minute contrarian strategy applied to a particular subset of securities over
the speciﬁed day. As discussed in Section 5.1, days with negative average returns in Table 2
correspond to those days when price pressure due to a trending common factor overwhelmed
mean-reverting idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. This interpretation, coupled with the cumu-
lative returns of various factor-based portfolios in Figure 11 allows us to visually detect
the intra-day emergence of price pressure and determine when the liquidation began and in
which factor-based portfolios it was concentrated. Based on these results, we have developed
the following set of hypotheses regarding the epicenter of the Quant Quake of August 2007:
1. The ﬁrst wave of deleveraging began as early as August 1 around 10:45am, with the ac-
32Our analysis also shows a sudden change in liquidity on September 18th, which was the day the U.S.
Federal Open Market Committee lowered the target for the federal funds rate by 50 bps and the CBOE
Volatility Index dropped by more than 6 point to close at about 20. Based on cumulative intra-day returns
(which we have omitted to conserve space), the market values of our factor-based portfolios dropped and
subsequently recovered over the following two days, similar to the pattern observed in Figure 3.
33See footnote 8. Note that industries with fewer than 100 stocks are included in the Other Industries
subset.
39tivity apparently concentrated among factor-based subsets of stocks. One can visually
detect the sudden abnormal behavior of the long/short portfolios at the exact same
time in Figure 3. Portfolios based on Book-to-Market and Earnings-to-Price dropped
in value while portfolios based on the other three factors, Cashﬂow-to-Market, Earn-
ings Momentum and Price Momentum, gained a little, suggesting that portfolios being
deleveraged or unwound during this time were probably long Book-to-Market and
Earnings-to-Price factors and short the other three. This wave of activity was short-
lived and by approximately 11:30am that day, markets returned to normal. By the end
of the day, the contrarian strategy applied to all subsets except for Earnings Momen-
tum and Book-to-Market yielded positive average returns for the day (see Table 2),
implying that the liquidation may have been more heavily concentrated on portfolios
formed according to these two factors.
2. The second wave started on August 6th at the market open, and lasted until approxi-
mately 1:00pm. Once again, the action was concentrated among factor-based subsets.
This time, the price pressure due to the hypothesized forced liquidation was strong
enough to overcome the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and, as such, the contrarian
strategy applied to all factor-based subsets of stocks yielded negative returns for the
entire day. Earnings-Momentum and Book-to-Market portfolios within the ﬁnancial
sector suﬀered the largest losses, implying that the deleveraging was strongest among
these groups of stocks. The patterns in Figure 3 suggest that the portfolios being
deleveraged were probably long Book-to-Market, Price Momentum, and Cashﬂow-to-
Market, and short Earnings Momentum and Earnings-to-Price. Appendix A.3 contains
a more detailed analysis of the speciﬁc stocks that were aﬀected. August 6th was re-
markable in another respect—for the ﬁrst time in our sample, the contrarian strategy
applied to all stocks also registered a loss for the day (see Table 2), implying widespread
and strong price pressure due to a forced liquidation on this day.
3. On August 7th, portfolios based on Price Momentum and Cashﬂow-to-Market contin-
ued to drift downward as Figure 3 shows, suggesting continued deleveraging among
portfolios based on these two factors. Furthermore, the contrarian strategy applied to
all stocks yielded a second day of negative returns, suggesting that the forced liquida-
40tion carried over to this day.
4. August 8th was the start of the so-called “Meltdown”. On this day, the contrarian
strategy suﬀered losses when applied to any subset of stocks (factor-based, industry,
and market-cap). The sudden drop and subsequent reversal is clearly visible in Figure
3.
5. Starting on Friday August 10th, the long/short factor-based portfolios sharply reversed
their losing trend, and by the closing bell on Monday August 13th, all ﬁve long/short
portfolios were within 2% of their values on the morning of August 8th. We conjecture
that this reversal was due to two possible causes: new capital that came into the market
to take advantage of buying and selling opportunities created by the price impact of the
previous days’ deleveraging, and the absence of further deleveraging pressure because
the unwind that caused the initial losses was completed.
6. In addition to the hypothesized forced liquidation, we conjecture that part of the losses
from August 8th and 9th also stemmed from a reduction in liquidity, most likely from
certain hedge funds engaged in high-frequency marketmaking activities. Unlike NYSE
specialists and other designated marketmakers that are required to provide liquidity,
even in the face of strong price trends, hedge funds have no such obligation. However,
in recent years, such funds have injected considerable liquidity into U.S. equity markets
by their high-frequency program-trading activities. We have two reasons to believe that
reduced marketmaking activity is partly responsible for the August 2007 Meltdown.
First, as seen in Figure 10, the price impact of trades suddenly increased as of Friday,
August 10th—above and beyond the already elevated levels of the prior weeks—and
stayed high until the end of the following week, implying reduced market depth and
lower liquidity during that period. Second, Figure 4 shows that the R2’s of the turnover
regressions based on (1b) were also elevated during the week of August 6th, with values
of 10% or higher which were the highest R2’s for this regression during all of 2007.
Also, the R2 of the return-based regression (1a) was 13.9% on August 8th, once again
a record-setting level for all of 2007. But these R2’s and impact estimates were—with
the exception of the Price-Momentum factor—elevated throughout the week of August
416th, hence they cannot explain the widespread losses that occurred on August 8th and
9th. We suspect that at least part of the meltdown that began on August 8th was due
to a speciﬁc reduction in marketmakers’ capital, most likely by hedge funds engaged
in high-frequency mean-reversion trading strategies.
7. We conjecture that the motivation for the reduction in marketmaking capital is the
negative average returns for the all-stocks contrarian strategy during August 6th and
7th (see Table 2), which revealed a much larger pending unwind than marketmakers
could handle, and those marketmakers who had the option of reducing their exposure,
e.g., hedge funds, did so on August 8th.
In Appendix A.3, we show how the contrarian strategy can be used to identify with even
greater precision the speciﬁc stocks and sectors that were involved at the start of the Quant








Book to Market ￿
(Decile 1&10)￿
Cash flow to Market ￿
(Decile 1&10)￿




 Earnings Momentum ￿
(Decile 1&10)   ￿
2007/7/23￿ 6.19￿ 3.45￿ 1.94￿ 5.43￿ 5.97￿ 5.89￿ 6.38￿ 3.09￿
2007/7/24￿ 8.98￿ 3.61￿ 1.08￿ 5.93￿ 6.30￿ 6.38￿ 5.39￿ 3.71￿
2007/7/25￿ 7.98￿ 1.51￿ 0.63￿ 5.98￿ 5.19￿ 7.22￿ 6.53￿ 1.38￿
2007/7/26￿ 13.56￿ 4.20￿ 2.78￿ 7.42￿ 10.62￿ 8.85￿ 9.13￿ 8.43￿
2007/7/27￿ 9.63￿ 4.83￿ 2.04￿ 6.81￿ 10.49￿ 8.52￿ 7.58￿ 4.72￿
2007/7/30￿ 7.72￿ 2.99￿ 2.40￿ 4.94￿ 6.33￿ 6.16￿ 6.61￿ 4.53￿
2007/7/31￿ 7.40￿ 2.52￿ 0.53￿ 2.77￿ 3.71￿ 1.43￿ 2.74￿ 3.19￿
2007/8/1￿ 7.63￿ 3.94￿ 3.72￿ -0.83￿ 0.56￿ 0.44￿ 0.42￿ -2.27￿
2007/8/2￿ 9.28￿ 7.69￿ 1.64￿ 4.80￿ 6.63￿ 7.34￿ 7.84￿ 6.30￿
2007/8/3￿ 7.01￿ 2.53￿ 2.99￿ 4.45￿ 4.64￿ 5.44￿ 5.71￿ 2.72￿
2007/8/6￿ -1.55￿ -1.02￿ -1.21￿ -6.52￿ -3.32￿ -3.33￿ -5.41￿ -8.11￿
2007/8/7￿ -1.02￿ -2.24￿ 1.20￿ -0.68￿ 0.10￿ -1.34￿ -1.04￿ -3.50￿
2007/8/8￿ -26.30￿ -18.07￿ -5.54￿ -16.16￿ -15.21￿ -18.81￿ -23.27￿ -20.08￿
2007/8/9￿ -7.93￿ -14.97￿ -2.57￿ -5.36￿ -7.93￿ -5.72￿ -9.31￿ -11.08￿
2007/8/10￿ -3.02￿ -8.89￿ 2.54￿ -1.82￿ -0.25￿ 2.02￿ -3.87￿ -1.58￿
2007/8/13￿ -8.10￿ -3.24￿ 0.41￿ -7.22￿ -3.35￿ -5.05￿ -4.92￿ -4.49￿
2007/8/14￿ 5.94￿ 6.20￿ 4.99￿ 6.00￿ 5.59￿ 6.66￿ 7.32￿ 5.39￿
2007/8/15￿ 9.31￿ 6.42￿ 4.62￿ 9.25￿ 11.12￿ 10.98￿ 11.09￿ 5.57￿
2007/8/16￿ 12.97￿ 8.64￿ 7.61￿ 9.42￿ 8.50￿ 10.18￿ 11.85￿ 8.05￿











Medical Eq, Drugs ￿
Other Industries￿ All Stocks￿
2007/7/23￿ 7.58￿ 4.38￿ 3.18￿ 4.07￿ 3.98￿ 4.09￿ 4.09￿
2007/7/24￿ 8.41￿ 5.38￿ 3.84￿ 4.96￿ 5.87￿ 4.90￿ 4.90￿
2007/7/25￿ 7.07￿ 1.93￿ 2.41￿ 2.03￿ 4.63￿ 3.56￿ 3.56￿
2007/7/26￿ 10.81￿ 6.44￿ 5.74￿ 7.55￿ 7.60￿ 7.07￿ 7.07￿
2007/7/27￿ 9.53￿ 3.64￿ 6.53￿ 7.29￿ 5.43￿ 5.88￿ 5.88￿
2007/7/30￿ 6.10￿ 3.82￿ 3.86￿ 5.40￿ 6.70￿ 4.72￿ 4.72￿
2007/7/31￿ 8.02￿ 2.30￿ 3.60￿ 3.18￿ 7.94￿ 3.74￿ 3.74￿
2007/8/1￿ 9.18￿ 3.27￿ 11.13￿ 9.11￿ 3.98￿ 5.06￿ 5.06￿
2007/8/2￿ 9.53￿ 5.30￿ 9.42￿ 6.00￿ 10.09￿ 6.74￿ 6.74￿
2007/8/3￿ 10.23￿ 2.62￿ 3.31￿ 5.49￿ 6.14￿ 4.28￿ 4.28￿
2007/8/6￿ 3.01￿ -0.60￿ -1.57￿ -0.16￿ 4.04￿ -1.30￿ -1.30￿
2007/8/7￿ 0.48￿ -1.20￿ -2.20￿ 2.40￿ 5.58￿ -1.12￿ -1.12￿
2007/8/8￿ -20.89￿ -12.16￿ -24.57￿ -18.78￿ -16.36￿ -18.69￿ -18.69￿
2007/8/9￿ -4.37￿ -3.92￿ -11.69￿ -17.36￿ -7.01￿ -9.82￿ -9.82￿
2007/8/10￿ 0.56￿ 1.15￿ -10.56￿ -5.27￿ 0.12￿ -4.38￿ -4.38￿
2007/8/13￿ -3.78￿ -1.88￿ -8.20￿ 2.82￿ -1.07￿ -4.90￿ -4.90￿
2007/8/14￿ 6.36￿ 7.65￿ 5.36￿ 7.45￿ 4.34￿ 5.39￿ 5.39￿
2007/8/15￿ 8.32￿ 6.78￿ 5.59￿ 11.63￿ 5.30￿ 6.79￿ 6.79￿
2007/8/16￿ 8.69￿ 8.94￿ 9.89￿ 12.02￿ 12.96￿ 9.46￿ 9.46￿
2007/8/17￿ 14.67￿ 15.66￿ 11.58￿ 17.94￿ 13.71￿ 13.03￿ 13.03￿
By Size￿ By Factor ￿
By Industry￿
Table 2: The average returns for the contrarian strategy applied to various subsets of the S&P 1500 index using 5-minute
returns for July 23, 2007 to August 17, 2007. Each day is divided into non-overlapping 5-minute intervals, and positions are
established based on lagged 5-minute returns and held for the subsequent 5-minute interval. The average return for each subset
of stocks over each day of this period is then calculated. No overnight positions are allowed, initial positions are established
at 9:40am each day and all positions are closed at 4:00pm. All entries are in units of basis points.
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Book to Market (Decile 1&10)￿
Cash flow to Market (Decile 1&10)￿
Earnings to Price (Decile 1&10)￿
Price Momentum (Decile 1&10)￿
 Earnings Momentum (Decile 1&10)   ￿
By Industry￿




Health Care, Medical Eq, Drugs ￿
Other Industries￿
All Stocks￿
Figure 11: The cumulative returns for the contrarian strategy applied to various subset of the S&P 1500 index using 5-minute
returns for July 23, 2007 to August 17, 2007. Each day is divided into non-overlapping 5-minute intervals, and positions are
established based on lagged 5-minute returns and held for the subsequent 5-minute interval. The average return for each subset
of stocks over each day of this period is then calculated. No overnight positions are allowed, initial positions are established
at 9:40am each day and all positions are closed at 4:00pm.
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46 Conclusions
The events of August 2007 in U.S. equity markets provide a living laboratory for developing
insights into the dynamics of portfolio liquidity and marketmaking activity. By simulating
the performance of simple trading strategies that proxy for factor bets like Book-to-Market
and Cashﬂow-to-Market, we ﬁnd indirect evidence of the unwinding of factor-based portfolios
starting in July 2007, and continuing through August and September 2007. By simulating
the performance of a high-frequency (5-minute-return) mean-reversion strategy that proxies
for marketmaking activity, we ﬁnd indirect evidence that liquidity declined sharply during
the second week of August 2007, raising the possibility that marketmakers reduced their
risk capital in the face of mounting losses from the onslaught of portfolio liquidations by
long/short equity managers.
If these conjectures are well-founded, they point to a new ﬁnancial order in which the
“crowded trade” phenomenon now applies to entire classes of hedge-fund strategies, not
just to a collection of overly popular securities. In much the same way that a passing
speedboat can generate a wake with signiﬁcant consequences for other ships in a crowded
harbor, the scaling up and down of portfolios can have signiﬁcant consequences for all other
portfolios and investors. Managers and investors involved in long/short equity strategies
must now incorporate this characteristic in designing their portfolios and implementing their
risk management protocols. The Quant Meltdown of 2007 is another piece of evidence
supporting the claim by Chan et al. (2007) that systemic risk in the hedge-fund industry has
risen.
The hypothesized interplay between long/short equity managers and marketmakers is
consistent with the ecological view of ﬁnancial markets in Farmer and Lo (1999) and Farmer
(2002), and the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis of Lo (2004, 2005). In that framework, market
participants are not inﬁnitely rational, but they do learn over time and adapt to changing
market conditions. As the size (as measured by assets under management or risk capital) of
one “species” grows, the population dynamics change to reﬂect the impact of its dominance,
and in the case of the hedge-fund industry, we can observe these changes in real time given
how quickly managers and investors adapt and evolve. Although the fallout from August
2007 was severe for many market participants, nevertheless this narrow slice of time and
45industry has been a boon to academics interested in market dynamics.
Yet another interpretation of the Quant Meltdown of August 2007 is a case study in
the how betas are born. The fact that the entire class of long/short equity strategies moved
together so tightly during August 2007 implies the existence of certain common factors within
that class. The analysis in this paper conﬁrms the identities of several such factors, but more
reﬁned simulations may uncover others. In any case, there should be little doubt now about
the existence of “alternative betas”, which is the next step in the natural progression from
long-only investing to indexation to long/short investing to the nascent hedge-fund beta
replication industry. To the extent that the demand for alternative investments continues to
grow, the increasing amounts of assets devoted to such endeavors will create its own common
factors that can be measured, benchmarked, managed, and, ultimately, passively replicated
as proposed in Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007).
However, our conclusions must be circumscribed by the warning that we began with
in Section 1: all of our inferences are indirect, tentative, and speculative. We have no
inside information about the workings of the hedge funds that were aﬀected in August 2007,
nor do we have any access to proprietary prime brokerage records, trading histories, or other
conﬁdential industry data. Therefore, our academic perspective of the events during the week
of August 6–10 should be interpreted with some caution and a healthy dose of skepticism.
These qualiﬁcations were highlighted in Khandani and Lo (2007) and we repeat them here
for completeness.
Our empirical ﬁndings are based on very simple strategies applied to U.S. stocks, which
may be representative of certain short-term market-neutral mean-reversion strategies, but
is not likely to be as good a proxy for the broader set of quantitative long/short equity
products that involve both U.S. and international equities, and other securities. A more
reﬁned analysis using more sophisticated strategies and a broader set of assets will no doubt
yield a more complex and accurate picture of the very same events.
More importantly, even if our hypothesis is correct that an unwind initiated the losses
during the second week of August 2007, we cannot say much about the ultimate causes
of such an unwind. It is tempting to conclude that a multi-strategy proprietary trading
desk’s exposure to sub-prime mortgage portfolios caused it to reduce leverage by liquidating
a portion of its most liquid positions, e.g., a statistical arbitrage portfolio. However, another
46possible scenario is that several quantitative equity market-neutral managers decided at
the beginning of August that it would be prudent to reduce leverage in the wake of so
many problems facing credit-related portfolios. They could have deleveraged accordingly,
not realizing that this strategy was so crowded and that the price impact of their liquidation
would be so severe. Once this price impact had been realized, other funds employing similar
strategies may have decided to cut their risks in response to their losses, which then led
to the kind of “death spiral” that we witnessed in August 1998 as managers attempted to
unwind their ﬁxed-income arbitrage positions to meet margin calls.
Finally, we conjecture that liquidations of a number of strategies and asset classes may
have started earlier. For example, other liquid investment categories such as global macro,
managed futures, and currency strategies seem to have experienced similar unwinds earlier in
2007 as problems in the sub-prime mortgage markets became more prominent in the minds
of managers and investors. The so-called “carry trade” among currencies was supposedly
unwound to some extent in July and August 2007, generating losses for a number of global
macro and currency-trading funds. Obviously, our long/short equity strategies are incapable
of detecting dislocation among currency strategies, but a simple carry-trade simulation—
similar to our simulation of the contrarian trading strategy—could shed considerable light
on the dynamics of the foreign exchange markets in recent months. Indeed, a collection
of simulated strategies across all of the hedge-fund categories can serve as a kind of multi-
resolution microscope, one with many lenses and magniﬁcations, with which to examine the
full range of ﬁnancial-market activity and vulnerabilities. It is only by deconstructing every
market dislocation that we will eventually learn how to minimize their disruptive impact on
market participants, and we hope that the insights drawn from our simulations will encourage
others to take up this important challenge.
47A Appendix
In this Appendix, we provide the details of the the computation of expected proﬁts for the
contrarian trading strategy of Lehmann (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990), and its appli-
cation to transactions data on August 6, 2007. In Section A.1, we derive a general expression
for the expected proﬁt under the assumption of jointly covariance-stationary returns for in-
dividual securities. In Section A.2, we derive the expected proﬁt for the special case of the
linear factor model (7) which incorporates an idiosyncratic marketmaking component and a
common factor that may exhibit either mean reversion or momentum. And in Section A.3,
we show how the simulated returns of the contrarian strategy can be used to identify the
speciﬁc stocks that were at the center of the Quant Meltdown of August 2007.
A.1 Expected Proﬁts for Stationary Returns
Consider the collection of N securities and denote by Rt the N × 1 vector of their period t
returns, [R1,t    RN,t]′. Assume that Rt is a jointly covariance-stationary stochastic process
with expectation E[Rt] = µ = [ 1    N]′ and auto covariance matrices
E[(Rt−l − µ)(Rt − µ)
′] = Γl = [γi,j(l)] 








where the approximation is needed because period returns, Ri,t, are simple returns and
logarithm of a sum is not equal to the sum of the logarithms.
We will consider the return of a market-neutral strategy which invests an amount ωi,t in










Deﬁne πt(q) as the proﬁt for this strategy for a portfolio constructed at date t and held ﬁxed
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Note that M( ) is linear, i.e.,
M(A + B) = M(A) + M(B) (A.4)
M(αA) = αM(A) (A.5)














Note that if A = cc


















Combining these relations and substituting (A.2) into (A.1) yields:
E[πt(q)] ≈ M(Γ1) +     + M(Γq) + qM(µµ
′
)
49≈ M(Γ1) +     + M(Γq) − qσ
2(µ) (A.8)
A.2 Expected Proﬁts for a Linear Factor Model
Consider the following return-generating process:
Ri,t =  i + βiνt + λi,t + ηi,t (A.9a)












iǫi,t−2 +     , θi ∈ (0,1) (A.9b)
νt = ρνt−1 + ζt , ρ ∈ (−1,1) (A.9c)
where ǫi,t, ζt, and ηi,t are white-noise random variables that are uncorrelated at all leads and
lags.
In this speciﬁcation, βiνt represents a market-wide or common factor, ηi,t represents
ﬁrm-speciﬁc fundamental shocks, and λi,t represents ﬁrm-speciﬁc liquidity shocks. The spec-
iﬁcation of this liquidity component in (A.9b) may seem odd at ﬁrst, but has a natural in-
terpretation. It is an inﬁnite-order moving average where each term ǫi,t is meant to capture
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks to security i at time t, hence a positive realizations represents
buying pressure and vice versa for negative realizations. The coeﬃcients for these idiosyn-
cratic shocks are meant to decay at a rate of θi to reﬂect the gradual decline in buying or
selling pressure, and they sum to one so as to eliminate any long-term impact of these shocks
on prices.
The expressions for expected proﬁts derived in Section A.1 are functions of the variance-
covariance matrix of returns Ri,t. Since ǫi,t and ζt are uncorrelated at all leads and lags, the
covariance matrix of the Ri,t’s can be decomposed into two parts: a liquidity component and
a common-factor component. We will refer to these two parts as Γl,λ and Γl,ν, respectively,
which are related to the covariance matrix Γl by:
Γl = Γl,λ + Γl,ν . (A.10)
Because M( ) is linear, the above decomposition will simplify our derivation of expected
proﬁts. We now turn to computing each component of Γl.
Derivation of Γl,ν
















50Note that νt is multiplied by βi in the Ri,t, which will cause the covariance terms due to the






where β is a column vector of the βi’s. Appealing to the linearity and other properties of
































































To compute the covariance between λi,t and λi,t+l, we need to focus on the common ǫi,t’s in

















































































































where we use our expression for σ2
































Derivation of Expected Proﬁt
We can now combine Γl,ν and Γl,λ to yield an expression for the expected proﬁt of the
contrarian strategy. Recall that the expected proﬁt is given by:
E[πt(q)] ≈ M(Γ1) +     + M(Γq) − qσ
2(µ) . (A.16)
Due to the linearity of M( ) and using (A.10), we can rewrite this expression as:
E[πt(q)] ≈ M(Γ1,λ) +     + M(Γq,λ) +
M(Γ1,ν) +     + M(Γq,ν) − qσ
2(µ) . (A.17)
The two parts of this expression can be simpliﬁed as follows:




























































































A.3 Extreme Movers on August 6, 2007
Simulations of simple strategies such as the contrarian strategy can be used to pinpoint the
beginning of market dislocations when applied to transactions data. Recall that the intra-day
contrarian strategy of Section 5 invests $1 long in the worst performing decile and $1 short
in the best performing decile of lagged 5-minute returns. Given the position ωi,t of security
i at time t, the security’s contribution to the portfolio’s proﬁt or loss over the next period
is simply ωi,tRi,t. If this value is negative, it suggests that the security experienced either a
52negative return following a period of under-performance (recall that we invest $1 long in the
worst performing decile), or a positive return following a period of out-performance. While
such an outcome may be purely random, a suﬃciently high number of such occurrences over
a given day indicates a price trend for that security and systematic losses for the contarian
strategy. Therefor, the number of periods in which a security exhibited negative contributions
to the portfolio:  
t
I{ωi,tRi,t<0} (A.21)
can be used as a metric to detect the start of an unwind of mean-reversion strategies, as
well as a possible decline in market liquidity due to losses accumulated by marketmaking
strategies.
Under the scenario of pure randomness, i.e., independently and identically distributed
mean-zero returns, each security has a 1/5 chance of being included in the contrarian portfolio
in each time period (recall that we long and short the bottom- and top-performing deciles).
Once the portfolio is established, each position has a 1/2 chance of contributing a loss
(negative returns following a period of under performance or position return following a
period of outperformance).34 Therefore, each security has a 1/10 chance of contributing a
negative value to the return of the contrarian strategy over each interval so the expected
value of (A.21) for each security on any given day is 7.6 (recall that the contrarian strategy
takes position 76 times each day, starting at 9:40am and closing ﬁnal positions at 4:00pm).
We have ranked securities according to this metric for August 6, 2007 and list the secu-
rities with the top 50 values in Table A.1. We have also reported the decile ranking of each
security according to each of the ﬁve valuation factors as well as their market-capitalization
decile. The Open, High, Low and the Closing price as well as the High-Low spread, as a
measure of the intraday volatility, and the overall return for the day are also reported.
The stocks’ factor rankings in Table A.1 do not look random, but clearly show that the
extreme losers were concentrated in the ﬁnancial sector, and had extreme factor rankings in
at least three of our valuation factors and in size—high Book-to-Market, high Earnings-to-
Price, low Earnings Momentum, and low market cap.
34Recall that we are using 5-minute returns, which is close to zero mean, hence the loss probability of 1/2
is a reasonable approximation.
53Table A.1: Top 50 securities with highest loss rankings from the contrarian strategy applied to 5-minute returns of stocks in
the S&P 1500 on August 6, 2007. Securities are ranked based on
 
t I{ωi,tRi,t<0} where ωi,t is the weight assigned to security i
based on the returns over the preceding 5-minute interval and Ri,t is the return over the subsequent 5-minute interval. The









SIZE￿ Open ($)￿ High ($)￿ Low ($)￿ Close ($)￿
High-Low   ￿
Spread            ￿
(% of Close)￿
Day Return￿
RDN￿ RADIAN GROUP INC                ￿ Money & Finance￿ 35￿ 10￿ 10￿ 10￿ 1￿ 1￿ 6￿ 23.27￿ 24.50￿ 17.44￿ 23.23￿ 30%￿ 0%￿
SPF￿ STANDARD PACIFIC CORP NEW       ￿ Other Industries￿ 34￿ 10￿ 1￿ 10￿ 1￿ 1￿ 3￿ 12.25￿ 12.28￿ 7.51￿ 10.56￿ 45%￿ -14%￿
FFIV￿ F 5 NETWORKS INC                ￿ Computer, Software & Electronics￿ 31￿ 2￿ 2￿ 2￿ 10￿ 10￿ 7￿ 83.83￿ 84.00￿ 70.30￿ 72.43￿ 19%￿ -14%￿
IMB￿ INDYMAC BANCORP INC             ￿ Money & Finance￿ 29￿ 10￿ 1￿ 10￿ 1￿ 1￿ 4￿ 19.18￿ 21.15￿ 18.25￿ 20.03￿ 14%￿ 4%￿
SMP￿ STANDARD MOTOR PRODUCTS INC     ￿ Computer, Software & Electronics￿ 27￿ 10￿ 9￿ 4￿ 5￿ 10￿ 1￿ 10.92￿ 10.92￿ 7.88￿ 8.62￿ 35%￿ -21%￿
MTG￿ M G I C INVESTMENT CORP WIS     ￿ Money & Finance￿ 26￿ 10￿ 9￿ 10￿ 1￿ 3￿ 6￿ 33.75￿ 35.55￿ 28.93￿ 33.28￿ 20%￿ -1%￿
BZH￿ BEAZER HOMES USA INC            ￿ Other Industries￿ 25￿ 10￿ 1￿ 10￿ 1￿ 1￿ 2￿ 11.32￿ 11.60￿ 10.12￿ 10.96￿ 14%￿ -3%￿
FRNT￿ FRONTIER AIRLINES HLDGS INC     ￿ Other Industries￿ 25￿ 10￿ 8￿ 1￿ 2￿ 1￿ 1￿ 5.25￿ 5.27￿ 4.51￿ 4.89￿ 16%￿ -7%￿
GFF￿ GRIFFON CORP                    ￿ Manufacturing￿ 25￿ 9￿ 2￿ 10￿ 1￿ 2￿ 2￿ 15.70￿ 15.92￿ 12.00￿ 12.98￿ 30%￿ -17%￿
VCI￿ VALASSIS COMMUNICATIONS INC     ￿ Other Industries￿ 24￿ 4￿ 6￿ 9￿ 1￿ 1￿ 2￿ 9.52￿ 9.66￿ 7.67￿ 7.88￿ 25%￿ -17%￿
LAB￿ LABRANCHE & CO INC              ￿ Money & Finance￿ 24￿ 10￿ 10￿ 10￿ 1￿ 1￿ 1￿ 5.10￿ 6.37￿ 5.10￿ 6.19￿ 21%￿ 21%￿
LFG￿ LANDAMERICA FINANCIAL GROUP INC ￿ Money & Finance￿ 24￿ 10￿ 9￿ 9￿ 1￿ 9￿ 4￿ 57.10￿ 58.43￿ 54.32￿ 57.01￿ 7%￿ 0%￿
MESA￿ MESA AIR GROUP INC NEV          ￿ Other Industries￿ 24￿ 10￿ 1￿ 10￿ 1￿ 1￿ 1￿ 6.45￿ 6.45￿ 5.42￿ 6.11￿ 17%￿ -5%￿
ROIAK￿ RADIO ONE INC                   ￿ Other Industries￿ 23￿ 10￿ 9￿ 1￿ 4￿ 2￿ 2￿ 4.87￿ 4.92￿ 3.51￿ 4.05￿ 35%￿ -17%￿
CHUX￿ O CHARLEYS INC                  ￿ Wholesale & Retail￿ 22￿ 10￿ 10￿ 5￿ 5￿ 7￿ 1￿ 16.76￿ 16.76￿ 15.47￿ 16.39￿ 8%￿ -2%￿
CBG￿ C B RICHARD ELLIS GROUP INC     ￿ Money & Finance￿ 22￿ 1￿ 3￿ 4￿ 10￿ 9￿ 8￿ 31.16￿ 32.29￿ 28.08￿ 32.10￿ 13%￿ 3%￿
CFC￿ COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP      ￿ Money & Finance￿ 22￿ 10￿ 1￿ 10￿ 2￿ 3￿ 9￿ 24.70￿ 26.75￿ 23.64￿ 26.75￿ 12%￿ 8%￿
OMG￿ O M GROUP INC                   ￿ Manufacturing￿ 22￿ 7￿ 9￿ 2￿ 1￿ 9￿ 4￿ 43.50￿ 44.04￿ 40.29￿ 42.59￿ 9%￿ -2%￿
CHP￿ C & D TECHNOLOGIES INC          ￿ Computer, Software & Electronics￿ 22￿ N/A￿ 1￿ 1￿ 6￿ 1￿ 1￿ 4.85￿ 4.85￿ 4.13￿ 4.32￿ 17%￿ -11%￿
NDN￿ 99 CENTS ONLY STORES            ￿ Wholesale & Retail￿ 22￿ 8￿ 2￿ 2￿ 5￿ 7￿ 3￿ 11.71￿ 12.15￿ 11.20￿ 11.96￿ 8%￿ 2%￿
CELL￿ BRIGHTPOINT INC                 ￿ Wholesale & Retail￿ 22￿ 4￿ 1￿ 7￿ 1￿ 2￿ 3￿ 12.70￿ 12.73￿ 11.85￿ 12.34￿ 7%￿ -3%￿
ABK￿ AMBAC FINANCIAL GROUP INC       ￿ Money & Finance￿ 22￿ 10￿ 9￿ 10￿ 1￿ 3￿ 8￿ 62.42￿ 64.58￿ 57.80￿ 64.32￿ 11%￿ 3%￿
PNM￿ P N M RESOURCES INC             ￿ Other Industries￿ 21￿ 10￿ 8￿ 8￿ 5￿ 3￿ 5￿ 22.77￿ 23.50￿ 21.05￿ 22.37￿ 11%￿ -2%￿
ASTE￿ ASTEC INDUSTRIES INC            ￿ Manufacturing￿ 21￿ 3￿ 2￿ 3￿ 9￿ 10￿ 4￿ 50.23￿ 52.87￿ 47.61￿ 52.50￿ 10%￿ 5%￿
SRDX￿ SURMODICS INC                   ￿ Other Industries￿ 21￿ 2￿ 3￿ 2￿ 4￿ 8￿ 3￿ 44.92￿ 48.85￿ 44.52￿ 48.57￿ 9%￿ 8%￿
ETFC￿ E TRADE FINANCIAL CORP          ￿ Money & Finance￿ 21￿ 7￿ 8￿ 9￿ 4￿ 2￿ 8￿ 15.98￿ 16.29￿ 14.73￿ 16.19￿ 10%￿ 1%￿
CAS￿ CASTLE A M & CO                 ￿ Wholesale & Retail￿ 21￿ 5￿ 3￿ 9￿ 4￿ 4￿ 2￿ 29.29￿ 29.29￿ 26.86￿ 28.00￿ 9%￿ -4%￿
UTI￿ UNIVERSAL TECHNICAL INSTITUTE IN￿ Other Industries￿ 21￿ 2￿ 6￿ 5￿ 2￿ 7￿ 2￿ 23.06￿ 23.80￿ 22.00￿ 23.30￿ 8%￿ 1%￿
SPC￿ SPECTRUM BRANDS INC             ￿ Computer, Software & Electronics￿ 21￿ 10￿ 10￿ 1￿ 1￿ 2￿ 1￿ 4.50￿ 4.50￿ 3.77￿ 4.15￿ 18%￿ -8%￿
SRT￿ STARTEK INC                     ￿ Other Industries￿ 21￿ 9￿ 8￿ 3￿ 1￿ 1￿ 1￿ 10.27￿ 11.19￿ 10.19￿ 11.08￿ 9%￿ 8%￿
KBR￿ K B R INC                       ￿ Other Industries￿ 20￿ 5￿ 10￿ 2￿ N/A￿ N/A￿ 7￿ 31.93￿ 32.60￿ 31.15￿ 32.49￿ 4%￿ 2%￿
UNF￿ UNIFIRST CORP                   ￿ Wholesale & Retail￿ 20￿ 8￿ 8￿ 6￿ 8￿ 9￿ 2￿ 37.51￿ 39.11￿ 35.25￿ 38.76￿ 10%￿ 3%￿
MHO￿ M I HOMES INC                   ￿ Other Industries￿ 20￿ 10￿ 1￿ 10￿ 1￿ 1￿ 1￿ 23.66￿ 23.91￿ 22.49￿ 23.84￿ 6%￿ 1%￿
PRAA￿ PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES IN￿ Money & Finance￿ 20￿ 4￿ 5￿ 6￿ 10￿ 9￿ 3￿ 46.52￿ 51.64￿ 44.26￿ 51.52￿ 14%￿ 11%￿
CHB￿ CHAMPION ENTERPRISES INC        ￿ Other Industries￿ 20￿ 5￿ 5￿ 10￿ 1￿ 9￿ 3￿ 11.54￿ 11.54￿ 10.26￿ 10.88￿ 12%￿ -6%￿
BSC￿ BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC      ￿ Money & Finance￿ 20￿ 9￿ 1￿ 10￿ 1￿ 2￿ 9￿ 106.89￿ 113.81￿ 99.75￿ 113.81￿ 12%￿ 6%￿
FED￿ FIRSTFED FINANCIAL CORP         ￿ Money & Finance￿ 20￿ 10￿ 1￿ 10￿ 3￿ 3￿ 2￿ 40.73￿ 43.00￿ 38.73￿ 41.75￿ 10%￿ 3%￿
LEH￿ LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC    ￿ Money & Finance￿ 20￿ 8￿ 1￿ 10￿ 10￿ 5￿ 10￿ 56.50￿ 58.50￿ 52.63￿ 58.27￿ 10%￿ 3%￿
NILE￿ BLUE NILE INC                   ￿ Wholesale & Retail￿ 20￿ 1￿ 2￿ 2￿ 9￿ 10￿ 4￿ 82.00￿ 84.81￿ 78.20￿ 82.00￿ 8%￿ 0%￿
MEE￿ MASSEY ENERGY CO                ￿ Other Industries￿ 20￿ 6￿ 8￿ 2￿ 6￿ 3￿ 5￿ 19.10￿ 19.14￿ 17.90￿ 18.07￿ 7%￿ -5%￿
BBX￿ BANKATLANTIC BANCORP INC        ￿ Money & Finance￿ 19￿ 10￿ 1￿ 6￿ N/A￿ 1￿ 1￿ 7.75￿ 8.48￿ 7.53￿ 8.39￿ 11%￿ 8%￿
MBI￿ M B I A INC                     ￿ Money & Finance￿ 19￿ 10￿ 7￿ 10￿ 4￿ 4￿ 8￿ 50.81￿ 56.20￿ 48.95￿ 56.20￿ 13%￿ 11%￿
OMN￿ OMNOVA SOLUTIONS INC            ￿ Other Industries￿ 19￿ 2￿ 7￿ 2￿ 1￿ 2￿ 1￿ 5.22￿ 5.42￿ 4.80￿ 5.27￿ 12%￿ 1%￿
IFC￿ IRWIN FINANCIAL CORP            ￿ Money & Finance￿ 19￿ 10￿ 10￿ 10￿ 3￿ 1￿ 1￿ 10.18￿ 10.37￿ 9.32￿ 10.00￿ 11%￿ -2%￿
PMTC￿ PARAMETRIC TECHNOLOGY CORP      ￿ Computer, Software & Electronics￿ 19￿ 2￿ 2￿ 3￿ 10￿ 8￿ 5￿ 17.31￿ 17.49￿ 16.16￿ 16.61￿ 8%￿ -4%￿
MTEX￿ MANNATECH INC                   ￿ Health Care, Medical Eq, Drugs ￿ 19￿ 5￿ 9￿ 10￿ 7￿ 4￿ 1￿ 9.19￿ 9.43￿ 8.59￿ 8.93￿ 9%￿ -3%￿
CAR￿ AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC           ￿ Other Industries￿ 19￿ 10￿ 10￿ 1￿ N/A￿ 6￿ 6￿ 24.05￿ 24.97￿ 21.22￿ 23.28￿ 16%￿ -3%￿
MRO￿ MARATHON OIL CORP               ￿ Other Industries￿ 19￿ 5￿ 9￿ 10￿ 7￿ 8￿ 10￿ 50.29￿ 50.73￿ 46.97￿ 49.24￿ 8%￿ -2%￿
RSCR￿ RES CARE INC                    ￿ Health Care, Medical Eq, Drugs ￿ 19￿ 8￿ 5￿ 8￿ 5￿ 4￿ 2￿ 18.71￿ 19.13￿ 17.62￿ 18.60￿ 8%￿ -1%￿
CAE￿ CASCADE CORP                    ￿ Manufacturing￿ 19￿ 4￿ 5￿ 6￿ 10￿ 10￿ 3￿ 68.05￿ 68.57￿ 63.51￿ 66.14￿ 8%￿ -3%￿
Factor and Size Deciles￿ Price and Return Data￿
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